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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The Twelfth Amendment is a Rodney Dangerfield of the Constitu-
tion: it gets no respect. Indeed, it gets little discernible attention at 
all. The Amendment is rarely the subject of scholarly analysis1 or 
classroom discussion and never, prior to this symposium, the focus of 
                                                                                                                    
 * W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Centennial Chair of Law, Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin. 
 ** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. 
 We originally presented this Essay as part of the Florida State College of Law’s sympo-
sium “The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000,” on March 23, 
2001. We are grateful to the College of Law and Jim Rossi for organizing the symposium 
and inviting us to participate. We have benefited from thoughtful comments by the sympo-
sium participants, as well as from Stuart Benjamin, Earl Maltz, H.W. Perry, and Scot 
Powe, and from the excellent research assistance of Marlyn Robinson and Rajkumar Vin-
nakota. Each of us will of course blame the other for the errors that remain. 
 1. A preliminary search of the relevant databases reveals that no academic has writ-
ten a full-scale law review article on the Amendment. But see James C. Ho, Much Ado 
About Nothing: Dick Cheney and the Twelfth Amendment, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 227 
(2000). (It is no denigration of Mr. Ho to point out that he wrote as an associate of Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher and is not (yet?) a legal academic).  
 On the plus side, David Currie provides an excellent overview of the history of the 
Amendment in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 
1801-1829, at 39-65 (2001). Tadahisa Kuroda had earlier written an entire book on the sub-
ject, TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804 (1994), but that book seems to have been 
largely ignored in the legal academy save for a review by Michael Les Benedict in 15 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 205 (1997). Finally, one of us did select a feature of the Twelfth Amendment 
as the “stupidest” aspect of the Constitution. See Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections 
and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMM. 183-86 (1995), reprinted with slight 
changes in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 61-66 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). That, at least, is the sort of attention with 
which Mr. Dangerfield could sympathize. 
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an academic panel. Only professors of constitutional law—and 
probably not all of them—could even identify the Amendment’s sub-
ject matter, at least prior to the recent unpleasantness. 
 The tumultuous 2000 election, however, could have been the occa-
sion for the Twelfth Amendment to finally get its fifteen minutes of 
fame. George W. Bush’s selection of Dick Cheney to be his running 
mate presented problems under the Amendment’s “Habitation 
Clause,” which forbids electors from a given state (here, the Great 
State of Texas) from voting for both a presidential and vice-
presidential nominee from the same state as themselves. And the 
Amendment’s specific procedures for resolving disputed presidential 
elections seemed to point toward a political resolution of the Florida 
crisis by Congress—an option which was ultimately rejected in favor 
of a judicial resolution in Bush v. Gore.2 Even though the Twelfth 
Amendment seemed to speak directly to both these issues, the 
Amendment did not find itself catapulted out of obscurity to provide 
a resolution to the crisis. The interesting question—to us, at least—is 
“Why not?” Why was no one concerned that the Texas electors’ votes 
for Dick Cheney may have been unconstitutional? And why was the 
possibility that the Twelfth Amendment involves a “textual commit-
ment” of electoral disputes to Congress so readily rejected? In other 
words: what happened to the Twelfth Amendment’s fifteen minutes?3 
II.   THE TEXT AND PROVENANCE OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 
 In case it is necessary to refresh recollection, the Twelfth Amend-
ment reads as follows: 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by bal-
lot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall 
not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall 
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in dis-
tinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall 
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all 
persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for 
each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person hav-
                                                                                                                    
 2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 3. One possibility is that most of the Twelfth Amendment’s minutes have been 
misappropriated by the Eleventh Amendment, whose run seems to go on and on. See, e.g., 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., No 01-46, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9773 (Oct. 15, 
2001) (granting certiorari to consider the relevance of the Eleventh Amendment to proceed-
ings before a federal administrative agency); Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power? 
The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115 
(2001) (yet another Eleventh Amendment symposium).  
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ing the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of 
those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall 
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the 
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist 
of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a major-
ity of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right 
of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March 
next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in 
the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the Presi-
dent;—The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-
President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a major-
ity of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person 
have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, 
the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the pur-
pose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, 
and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. 
But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.4 
 For ease of reference, we will designate the first italicized portion 
of the Amendment quoted above as the “Habitation Clause,” which 
we discuss in Part III of this Essay. The second italicized portion en-
compasses the “Electoral Dispute Procedure,” which we discuss in 
Part IV. 
 Congress formally proposed the Amendment on December 9, 1803, 
when the House of Representatives joined the Senate, which had 
voted on December 2, in approving the proposal.5 Given the presence 
of seventeen states then in the Union, it required ratification by thir-
teen of them. New Hampshire became the thirteenth state on June 
15, 1804.6 
                                                                                                                    
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).  
 5. It was not, however, signed by the presiding officers of the House and Senate until 
December 12. See 2 Stat. 306 (1803). 
 6. Interestingly enough, New Hampshire’s Governor on June 20 vetoed this act of 
the legislature, and it did not then receive the two-thirds approval required by the state 
constitution to override the veto. Given the language of Article V and its specification that 
amendments shall become effective “when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of 
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof,” it is certainly arguable that 
the veto was irrelevant and that the June 15 ratification was good. Should one reject this 
view, then the Amendment did not become operative until Tennessee’s ratification on July 
27, 1804. In any event, Secretary of State James Madison, in a circular letter to the gover-
nors of the several states dated September 25, 1804, declared that the Amendment had 
been ratified by three-fourths of the States. 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION: 
AMENDMENTS I-XII 447 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Both Delaware and 
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 This formal history of the Amendment scarcely does justice to the 
political realities behind its proposal and ratification. The election of 
1800, of course, was a fiasco that threatened to become a full-fledged 
constitutional crisis in a far more serious way than the 2000 election 
ever did.7 The earlier election exposed a glaring deficiency of the 
original 1787 Constitution—the assumption that there would be no 
party system and, therefore, that a “politics of virtue” would deter-
mine the presidential and vice-presidential selections rather than a 
“politics of party.” Thus, under that Constitution, each elector voted 
for two candidates, at least one of whom had to be from a state other 
than the elector’s own.8 The top candidate, assuming that he received 
a majority of the electoral votes, became President. The runner-up, 
even if receiving less than a majority, became Vice President.9 
 It is tempting to view the Habitation Clause as a mild disincentive 
against an unseemly assertion of power by a large state determined 
to place two of its own as leaders of the Executive. The eminent his-
torian Jack Rakove has suggested, however, that: 
the reason electors have to cast a 2d vote for someone from another 
state is not to prevent a power grab by one state but to increase 
the likelihood that the [electoral college] will actually make a deci-
sive choice; i.e., 1st votes will go to favorite sons, 2d votes to more 
distinguished characters, so as Madison explains at one point in 
the Convention, electors’ second choices are likely to be the first 
rank in point of quality.10 
 Whatever the rationale, in 1796 this structure yielded the election 
of John Adams as President and Thomas Jefferson as Vice President. 
Adams received only one vote more than the 70 required to achieve a 
majority of the total of 138 votes, and Jefferson received 68 votes, 
nine more than the 59 votes received by the South Carolina Federal-
ist Thomas Pinckney.11 (Aaron Burr trailed with only 30 votes).12 As 
Professor Kuroda notes, Jefferson prevailed over Pinckney only be-
cause the “Federalists threw so many votes away”13 from their own 
vice-presidential candidate in order to make sure that there would be 
                                                                                                                    
Connecticut rejected the Amendment, and Massachusetts did not get around to ratifying it 
until 1961! Id. at 448.   
 7. See BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA AFIRE: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, AND THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800 (2000), for an excellent recent retelling of the tale; see 
also Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change, 
108 YALE L.J. 1959 (1999). 
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 9. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 514 
(1993) (discussing the effects of this system). 
 10. E-mail from Jack N. Rakove, Professor of History and American Studies, Stanford 
Univ., to Sanford Levinson (November 27, 2000) (on file with Levinson). 
 11. WEISBERGER, supra note 7, at 167. 
 12. Id. 
 13. KURODA, supra note 1, at 108. 
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no tie for the Presidency that would cause the decision to be thrown 
into the House of Representatives, which, under the 1787 Constitu-
tion, would choose the President from among the five top recipients 
of electoral votes.14 One will never know, of course, how the course of 
American history might have been different had the Federalists been 
better at strategic voting and caused Jefferson, therefore, to remain a 
mere private citizen between 1797 and 1801. 
 Even by 1796, then, it had become clear that political parties were 
the developing reality of American politics; by the turn of the new 
century, the President and Vice President of the United States had 
become the highly antagonistic leaders of the Federalist and Democ-
ratic-Republican parties, respectively. Each ran with party compatri-
ots who were to receive the votes of party-oriented electors for the 
Vice Presidency, thus eliminating, presumably, the possibility of a 
President and Vice President who headed conflicting political parties. 
The new scheme would have operated perfectly in 1800 had the De-
mocratic-Republican electors had the wit to withhold at least one 
vote for their number-two candidate, the New Yorker Aaron Burr, 
and thus make him unequivocally second, albeit by only one vote, to 
Jefferson.15 Instead, they all voted for both candidates, and since the 
original Constitution did not set up separate tracks for contenders for 
the Presidency and Vice Presidency, Jefferson and Burr were tied.16 
Because the Electoral College was unable to choose a President, the 
choice devolved upon the House of Representatives, voting on a one-
state, one-vote basis. 
 The House ultimately—though only after six days and thirty-six 
ballots—chose Jefferson to be President, with Burr then becoming 
Vice President.17 Historians have attributed this result to a mixture 
of Hamilton’s disdain for Burr, whom Hamilton thought to be un-
scrupulous, and veiled threats by Southern governors to call out the 
state militias to march on the new capitol in Washington.18 Not sur-
                                                                                                                    
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1 (amended by Twelfth Amendment). This would have made 
Samuel Adams, a Democratic-Republican who received 15 electoral votes, the fifth candi-
date. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION 1074 (1975). 
 15. As we have recounted, the Federalists of 1796 had the foresight to guard against a 
tie, but not to withhold only so many votes as needed to avoid that dire fate and still elect 
their party favorite to the Vice Presidency. The Democrats, on the other hand, apparently 
(mis)learned from 1796 that it was unsafe to withhold even a single vote.  
 16. The Federalists had indeed learned the right lesson from 1796, so that in 1800 
they gave 65 electoral votes to John Adams, 64 votes to Charles C. Pinckney and one lone 
vote to former Chief Justice John Jay, thus avoiding the dreaded tie vote. See U.S. BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 1074. 
 17. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 743-50 (recounting the denouement); 
see also WEISBERGER, supra note 7, at 271-75. Burr’s most notable act during his term of 
office, of course, would be killing his bitter enemy Hamilton in a duel. 
 18. According to Joanne Freeman, “Republicans spoke seriously about taking arms 
against the Federalists if they withheld the presidency from Jefferson.” Freeman, supra 
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prisingly, Democratic-Republican majorities in Congress proposed 
the Twelfth Amendment and its establishment of separate votes for 
the offices of President and Vice President as a means of precluding 
such embarrassments in the future.19 Interestingly enough, Federal-
ists opposed the Amendment. They did so because, says Professor 
Currie, they knew that “they were unlikely to be able to muster a 
majority of the electors in the foreseeable future” and therefore “did 
their best to preserve the unholy possibility that they might be able 
to choose between their opponents in the House.”20 Among other 
things, of course, this reminds us that electoral rules are never in 
fact chosen behind a “veil of ignorance,”21 but are almost invariably 
known (or at least sincerely believed) to carry with them specific 
short-run consequences to the benefit or detriment of a given political 
party. 
 Professor Currie also notes the presence of two ways, not chosen 
by Congress, to solve the dilemmas exposed by the 1796 and 1800 
elections. One would have simply required that electors cast only one 
vote rather than two. “Never again would there be a tie between a 
party’s presidential and vice-presidential candidates”22 because there 
would, in fact, be no such thing as a vice-presidential candidate. As 
envisioned by the idealistic framers, the Vice President—that is, the 
person coming in second in the vote, unless a tie had to be broken by 
                                                                                                                    
note 7, at 1987 n.115. Indeed, “two states began to organize their militia to seize the gov-
ernment for Jefferson if Burr prevailed.” Id. at 1963 (citing HARRY AMMON, JAMES 
MONROE: THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 192-93 (1990); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON 
AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 503-04 (1962); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: 
FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 7-11 (1970)). These realities of the 1800 election only under-
score the fatuity of considering the events of November-December 2000 a political “crisis.” 
 19. It should not go without mention that there was an extensive and fascinating de-
bate about the consequences of moving to what Senator White of Delaware (one of the two 
states that in fact rejected the amendment) called a “designating mode of election.” 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 458. Thus, according to White, the initial mode 
of election was designed “to secure the election of the best men in the country, or at least 
those in whom the people reposed the highest confidence,” as demonstrated by the fact that 
the Vice President would be the person “who had been honored with the second largest 
number of the suffrages of the people for” the Presidency itself. Id. Now, however, a politi-
cal party will in effect make its choice as to the Vice Presidency.  
In this angry conflict of parties, against the heat and anxiety of this political 
warfare, the Vice Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much 
worse, prostituted to the basest purposes; character, talents, virtue, and merit, 
will not be sought after, in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he 
capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connexions, by his 
wealth, by his local situation, by his influence, or his intrigues, best promote 
the election of a President. He will be made the mere stepping stone of ambi-
tion. 
Id. at 459. Whether or not the consequences have been quite so dire as suggested by Sena-
tor White, it is hard to deny the deep consequences of this aspect of the Twelfth Amend-
ment. There was nothing minor or “technical” about it. 
 20. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 41. 
 21. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). 
 22. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 43. 
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the House—would indeed be a person deemed thoroughly capable of 
being President.23 This, suggests Currie, is decidedly not the case 
with regard to the office as it has historically developed; with some 
notable exceptions, the office has featured relative lightweights.24 
“The twelfth amendment,” he argues, “is stacked against selection of 
a Vice-President qualified to take over the Presidency.”25 
 A second alternative is simply the abolition of the office of Vice 
President.26 Although recent Vice Presidents seem to have been able 
to persuade the President to delegate some greater responsibilities, 
in many instances the Vice President has existed mostly to attend a 
variety of funerals and fund-raising events that the President does 
not have time for. And the value of having a Vice President available 
to assume the Presidency on a moment’s notice depends on the com-
petence of the persons holding the office, a subject treated in the 
paragraph immediately above. It is certainly unclear, though, why 
any very able politician would aspire to hold an office whose sole offi-
cial duty is presiding over the Senate and whose effective power is 
entirely a matter of presidential grace. 
 Whatever the merits of these arguments, they were obviously re-
jected or ignored by the Congress, which preferred to retain the elec-
tion of both President and Vice President. In so doing, Congress also 
                                                                                                                    
 23. The runner-up might, of course, also be a person thoroughly antagonistic to the 
winner—a situation which would present problems of its own. To the extent that recent 
Vice Presidents, such as Mr. Gore and Mr. Cheney, have been able to forge a meaningful 
role in policymaking, that role seems to have depended on a high degree of trust between 
them and the President. Professor Currie’s first alternative thus might result in a Vice 
President who is highly qualified to assume the top job in the event of tragedy but who is 
otherwise thoroughly marginalized in a hostile administration. The Framers of the Twelfth 
Amendment obviously had the then-recent Adams-Jefferson administration to look back 
on, and may have rejected this alternative for similar reasons. 
 24. Would anyone in 1952 have seriously suggested that either Richard Nixon or John 
Sparkman, the vice-presidential running mates of Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Steven-
son, respectively, was at that time qualified to be President? Nixon was chosen for a vari-
ety of reasons, ranging from his providing regional “balance” to his prominence as the chief 
congressional antagonist of Alger Hiss to, perhaps most importantly, his perceived success 
in delivering the California delegation to Eisenhower on a key procedural vote at the 1952 
Republican convention that was crucial to Eisenhower’s nomination (and assured the de-
mise of any lingering hopes that California’s “favorite son,” Earl Warren, had to receive the 
nomination himself). See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN 
1913-1962, at 248-61 (1987); IRWIN GELLMAN, THE CONTENDER: RICHARD NIXON: THE 
CONGRESS YEARS 1946-1952, at 441-43 (1999). Sparkman, who had supported the Dixie-
crat presidential candidacy of Strom Thurmond in 1948 against Harry Truman, was able 
to craft a “compromise” plank on civil rights in the 1952 convention, and his selection by 
Stevenson presumably reassured the then solidly Democratic South that Stevenson was 
not “irresponsible” on civil rights and could therefore be trusted not to go “too far” in any 
programs to help Southern African Americans. See the entry on John Sparkman in 20 
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 419 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999). 
 25. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 43. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that many of 
our recent Vice Presidents clearly had the stature and competence to serve as President.  
 26. Id. at 44-46. 
932  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:925 
 
carried over into the new Amendment—without significant discus-
sion—the language of the original constitution that precluded voting 
for two fellow-inhabitants,27 as well as devolving to Congress the se-
lection of the two officials should the Electoral College be unable to 
achieve definitive resolution. This means that, while one might have 
thought the phrase “obscure provision of the Twelfth Amendment” to 
be a redundancy, we deal in fact with parts of that Amendment that 
escaped significant attention even in 1803. 
III.   THE CONTEMPORARY (IR)RELEVANCE OF THE HABITATION CLAUSE 
 Our first task in this paper is to examine the possible application 
of the Twelfth Amendment’s Habitation Clause28 to the 2000 presi-
dential election. The question is this: did Texas electors, in casting 
their votes for both George W. Bush and Richard Cheney, violate the 
constitutional command that they must “vote by ballot for President 
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant 
of the same state with themselves”?29 Both of us agree that there are 
plausible—that is, nonfrivolous—arguments that Mr. Cheney, like 
Mr. Bush, was a Texan and that, therefore, the Twelfth Amend-
ment’s bar meant that the votes of the Texas electors did not count, 
with the result that either Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney, or both did not in 
fact gain a majority of the electoral vote. We are all too aware that 
most constitutional analysts find this argument almost literally in-
credible and some, no doubt, would find it covered by the ban of Rule 
11 on frivolous arguments. We want to explore whether this disdain 
is justified and, indeed, to take this section of the Amendment seri-
ously enough to explore what meanings might be given the term “in-
habitant” under different modal approaches to the Constitution.30 
 It is important to emphasize that we view our project less as an 
exercise in normative jurisprudence—that is, what does the Consti-
tution, correctly interpreted, require with regard to certain issues—
                                                                                                                    
 27. Professor Currie’s copious analysis of the debates surrounding the Twelfth 
Amendment includes no discussion of the Habitation Clause. This strongly suggests, of 
course, that absolutely no notice was taken of it during the debate. The lack of notice might 
be evidence either of the deep commitment of the generation of 1803 to maintaining what 
they believed to be an important decision rule or of the sheer thoughtlessness of the mem-
bers of Congress. 
 28. Discussion at Tallahassee indicated that we may be the first scholars to “name” 
this patch of constitutional text. Although Rick Pildes suggested that the better name 
would be “Cohabitation Clause,” we stick with our original choice in order to preserve the 
good name of the Florida State University Law Review as a family publication. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This language, as we have said, simply replicates the 
wording of Article II, Section 1. 
 30. The use of the term “modal,” of course, is a giveaway that we will be applying 
some of the approach to constitutional analysis identified with our colleague Philip Bob-
bitt. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-8 
(1982); PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991). 
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than as an inquiry about the circumstances in which the community 
of trained constitutional analysts and the surrounding community of 
commentators and pundits do (or do not) pay attention to one or an-
other constitutional argument. One can, of course, view the “market-
place of ideas” as a perfectly functioning market in which only meri-
torious ideas will gain credence; as Holmes (or Richard Posner) 
might have put it, the best way of identifying ideas worthy of respect 
is to determine which in fact dominate the marketplace. Less happy, 
though we suspect more true, is the possibility that the marketplace 
of ideas, like all markets, has its own distortions and blind spots, so 
that the ignoring of certain arguments by opinion makers within the 
market says more about the sociology of the market than it does 
about the quality of the ideas.31  
 We will, it should be noted, be asking similar questions with re-
gard to the other section of the Amendment we will be discussing 
presently, which involves congressional resolution of electoral college 
deadlocks. We will ask whether one can legitimately read that sec-
tion as a “textual commitment” of electoral-vote controversies to 
Congress, leaving courts with literally nothing to say about such 
matters. If that reading is possible, then an obvious question is to 
speculate on why the Supreme Court apparently did not take it seri-
ously when resolving the issues presented in Bush v. Gore.32 Given 
the fact that the two of us have rather different views about the mer-
its of that decision, we must emphasize yet again that our contribu-
tion, such as it is, is analytic rather than normative, whatever prob-
lems might obviously be raised by that distinction. 
 So let us turn to the question at hand, the habitation of Dick Che-
ney. At the time of his public designation by then-candidate George 
W. Bush, the Governor of Texas, Dick Cheney was not only the head 
of the team charged with advising the Governor on his choice of a 
                                                                                                                    
 31. Consider an area of contemporary constitutional controversy: whether there exists 
federalistic limits, appropriate for judicial application, on congressional exercises of power 
under Article I, Section 8, or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Young believes 
that the widespread disdain for arguments in favor of such limits between, say, 1945 and 
1975, is better evidence of the sociology of the legal academy and judiciary than of genuine 
merit. Mr. Levinson believes that the present acceptability of such arguments is similarly 
better explained by sociology than by merit. We may disagree on the specifics of certain de-
cisions. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1995) (striking down the Brady Act’s 
requirement that state officials conduct federally mandated background checks for hand-
gun purchasers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the federal 
Gun Free School Zones Act as outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power). What is 
far more important, however, is our agreement that the intellectual marketplace is 
scarcely perfect in its working and that one must always credit the possibility that imper-
fection is present (and therefore needs explanation). 
 32. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
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running mate,33 but also the C.E.O. of the Halliburton Company, a 
multibillion-dollar corporation whose home office was Dallas, Texas. 
One of us wrote an op-ed piece for The New York Times, published 
under the title “2 Texans, not 1,”34 and James C. Ho notes that the is-
sue was discussed in a number of public venues, including The Kan-
sas City Star, Denver Post, and The Boston Globe.35 We can also both 
testify to the topic’s having generated an active discussion among the 
constitutional law professors who participate in an internet discus-
sion group. 
 We, of course, would be the last people to criticize anyone for 
wanting to become a Texan. But most truly worthwhile things in life 
have their price, and in Dick Cheney’s case that price seems to be ex-
acted by the Twelfth Amendment’s command that when a state’s 
electors “vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of [those 
officers], at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves.”36 Everyone agrees that if Cheney counted as an “inhabi-
tant” of Texas, then the Lone Star State’s electors would have been 
put to the disheartening choice of voting for either George W. Bush 
for President or Richard Cheney for Vice President, but not both. In 
most elections, such a sacrifice might not matter. But in the hair’s-
breadth election of November 2000, removing Texas’s thirty-two elec-
tors from the Republican column would have thrown the election to 
the other side.37 
                                                                                                                    
 33. The possible conflict of interest between advisor Cheney and candidate Cheney is 
not of constitutional significance and therefore remains unexamined in this Essay, though 
it might certainly be of interest to political scientists. 
 34. Sanford Levinson, 2 Texans, not 1, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, at A27. 
 35. See Ho, supra note 1, at 245-46 n.4. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend XII. This appears to establish the day the electors meet as the 
relevant time at which to determine habitation, and for obvious reasons, this is the posi-
tion taken by Mr. Cheney himself in responding to interrogatories concerning his habita-
tion. Thus he defined the central issue as “will Respondent be an inhabitant of the State of 
Texas on December 18, 2000 at the time the defendant Texas Electors cast their ballots for 
President and Vice President.” See Defendant Richard B. Cheney’s Response and Objec-
tions to First Combined Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Admission to Defendant 
Richard B. Cheney at 2, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex 2000) (No. 3:00-CV-
2243-D) [hereinafter Cheney’s Response to Interrogatories]. One might wish to argue that 
a better interpretation would fix habitation at the time of nomination or, possibly, election 
in order to prevent “strategic” changes of habitation designed to frustrate whatever pur-
poses might underlie the Habitation Clause. (This assumes, of course, that one wishes to 
give it a purposive rather than a purely formal reading.) 
 37. It is not obvious which election, however. One can imagine at least three options: 
(1) throw out the thirty-two votes for Cheney, yielding a Bush-Lieberman administration 
(on the assumption that the Senate would have split 50-50 and that then-Vice President 
Gore would have been authorized, as President of the Senate, to break the tie by voting for 
his own running mate); (2) throw out the thirty-two votes for Bush, yielding either a Gore-
Cheney administration or, quite possibly, a Bush-Cheney administration with Bush having 
been chosen by the House of Representatives (given that neither presidential candidate 
would have received a majority of the 538 electoral votes); or (3) throw out all the Texas 
votes as simply “miscast,” giving a complete victory to Gore-Lieberman or, once more, re-
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 Although the Republican ticket’s Twelfth Amendment problem 
thus clearly “matters” in the sense that the error we allege was not 
harmless, the argument was in fact not taken at all seriously by 
courts or, if truth be known, by editorial writers and pundits who 
help to establish the boundaries of public discussion. Musings by law 
professors or even op-eds in The New York Times scarcely demon-
strate that a given point is granted the status of a truly serious pro-
posal. One might cite, for example, the widespread dismissal of Pro-
fessor Bruce Ackerman’s 1998 argument that the Twentieth 
Amendment, deeply understood, prohibited the lame-duck House of 
Representatives from issuing a Bill of Impeachment that the Senate 
was bound to accept (and try) in the next session of Congress.38 Ac-
kerman’s status as a Yale professor and, even more importantly, as 
one of the most creative minds in the legal academy, served as much 
to discredit as to establish the legitimacy of his argument.39 A similar 
fate befell the Twelfth Amendment argument, save that, unlike the 
Twentieth Amendment argument with regard to impeachment, the 
matter was actually considered by a judicial opinion issued after a 
group of Texas voters filed suit in November challenging the legiti-
macy of a vote by Texas’s electors for both Bush and Cheney.40 Quite 
significantly, though, that litigation generated very little publicity 
and the decision that dismissed the suit was distinctly overshadowed 
by the melodrama occurring in Florida.41 
                                                                                                                    
quiring resolution by Congress if one includes Texas’s vote in the denominator used to 
compute the number of votes required to gain a majority. Common-sensically, the correct 
outcome is most certainly (1), since it would seem obvious that preferences for President 
should be preferred over preferences for Vice President. (Mr. Levinson will resist the temp-
tation to comment that the 2000 election might present an exception to this generality.) 
But this answer is hardly the only plausible resolution, and it is certainly not derived from 
the barebones text. 
 38. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT (1999), 
which elaborates testimony originally presented to the House Judiciary Committee consid-
ering whether to impeach President Clinton. One example of the response to the argument 
is found in RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, 
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 128-30 (1999), where Posner harshly dismisses Acker-
man’s arguments as “unreasonable.” Id. at 129. Mr. Levinson, for one, believes that Ac-
kerman’s argument is both serious and profound. Mr. Young, on the other hand, has to sti-
fle an urge to check his wallet whenever such “deep understandings” are advanced. 
 39. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1246 (1995) (not-
ing—and criticizing—“the emergence of a distinctive new ‘Yale school’ of constitutional in-
terpretation”). 
 40. See Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000). The Fifth Circuit sum-
marily affirmed. Jones v. Bush, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000). The opinion, in its entirety, 
reads, “All requested relief is DENIED.” Jones v. Bush, No. 00-11346 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 
2000). Mr. Levinson participated in the Jones litigation on the side of the plaintiffs.  
 41.  Interestingly enough, the Jones court determined “that this opinion should not be 
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth 
Cir. R. 47.5., 28 U.S.C.A.” Jones v. Bush, No. 00-11346 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000). The propri-
ety of such unpublished opinions is discussed in Judge Arnold’s bombshell opinion in Anas-
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 Why was the Habitation Clause argument not taken more seri-
ously? We obviously reject one answer—that it is simply frivolous on 
the merits. To say that an argument is nonfrivolous, however, does 
not mean that it is correct. We certainly do not insist that it is; in-
deed, the two of us might well disagree if forced to indicate how each 
would adjudicate the dispute. Both of us, however, whatever our 
other differences might be, strongly believe that it is plausible—at 
least as plausible as any number of other constitutional claims that 
are taken quite seriously,42 including some in the litigation surround-
ing the Florida unpleasantness. We thus turn to what we consider 
more interesting explanations. 
A.   The Ontology of Habitation; or, Exactly Where Is Dick Cheney 
From, Anyway, and Does Anybody Care? 
 The plaintiffs who filed suit following the November election, 
seeking an injunction against the Texas electors voting for both Bush 
and Cheney, claimed to list twenty facts that ostensibly demon-
strated Cheney’s status as an “inhabitant” of Texas.43 Several of them 
were in fact variations on the fact that his primary residence, pur-
chased for $1,663,270 on November 3, 1995, was in Highland Park, a 
wealthy suburb of Dallas, and that he had filed for and received the 
Texas homestead exemption on his property tax in the years 1995-
2000. Moreover, he was registered to vote in Texas and had voted at 
least twice in one of the Highland Park precincts (though one of the 
more amusing facets of the 2000 race was the discovery that Cheney 
had quite regularly not taken the trouble to vote, including, appar-
ently, his skipping the 2000 Republican primary in Texas). Needless 
to say, Cheney possessed a Texas driver’s license and registered his 
automobiles in that state. And, as he noted in an answer to an inter-
rogatory, all magazines that he subscribed to “have been delivered to 
Respondent’s house in Dallas, former office at Halliburton and to his 
townhouse in McLean, Virginia.”44 
                                                                                                                    
tasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), which was vacated as moot upon set-
tlement of the case. Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917EM, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
33247 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en banc). 
 42. For a discussion of whether any argument can really be “frivolous” in a post-
Realist world of legal indeterminacy, see Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers 
Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986). Even conceding that the 
set of “frivolous” arguments exists and that there is some sort of overlapping consensus 
among most lawyers regarding most arguments within that set, cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), we doubt that the Twelfth Amendment ar-
gument addressed here falls within that category. 
 43. See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Brief, 
at 4ff, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (No. 3:00-CV-2543-D). 
 44. Cheney’s Response to Interrogatories, supra note 36, at 6. 
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 All of this was unavailing. Judge Sidney Fitzwater45 first deter-
mined that the plaintiffs had no standing to make their claim.46 He 
nonetheless went on to decide it on the merits anyway, “[g]iven the 
importance of entering a ruling that will assist the parties in obtain-
ing full appellate review” prior to the meeting of the Electoral College 
on December 18, 2000.47 Judge Fitzwater argued that determination 
of the meaning of “inhabitant” in the Twelfth Amendment required 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Who, for what it is worth (and, no doubt, opinions will differ on the worth of this 
observation), is a Republican, appointed to the bench at the age of 33 by President Reagan 
in 1986. See WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 2001, at 1655 (2001). 
 46. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 717-18. The standing issue warrants a somewhat ex-
tended comment because the possibility that no plaintiff would have standing to enforce 
the Twelfth Amendment’s Habitation Clause is surely related to (if not dispositive of) the 
“relevance” of that provision. The Jones plaintiffs asserted three different interests for 
standing purposes: (1) “a right, as do all citizens of the United States, for the election for 
President and Vice-President in the Electoral College to be held in strict accordance with 
the Constitution of the United States and all laws governing the conduct of elections”; (2) 
“a right to protect the interests of the non-defendant candidates for President and Vice-
President”; and (3) a “right to cast a ‘meaningful vote.’” Id. Judge Fitzwater rejected the 
first two interests on fairly familiar grounds, involving the prudential rules against asser-
tion of generalized grievances and third-party standing. See id. at 717-18. 
 The third interest is more troublesome. Judge Fitzwater said that the alleged injury to 
the plaintiffs’ right to cast a meaningful vote “is necessarily abstract, and plaintiffs con-
spicuously fail to demonstrate how they, as opposed to the general voting population, will 
feel its effects.” Id. at 717. As Texas voters, however, the plaintiffs surely had a more spe-
cific interest in their votes going to electors who would follow the law than members of “the 
general voting population” in other states. Moreover, as Pam Karlan has pointed out, it is 
hard to reconcile such a limited notion with the considerably broader notions presumably 
underlying contemporary voting rights cases involving so-called racial gerrymandering. 
For example, the Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), granted standing to plain-
tiffs who by no stretch of the imagination demonstrated “a particularized, palpable injury.” 
See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection 
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, 
GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein and Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection]. 
 Full consideration of the standing problem would require a considerably longer article. 
In particular, we would want to explore (and perhaps conduct an internal debate) on Mr. 
Young’s initial view that standing in such cases should be limited to the “best plausible” 
plaintiff, which in Jones v. Bush would have been Vice President Gore or his running mate, 
Senator Joseph Lieberman. Their failure to sue in Texas—perhaps because they were dis-
tracted by the events occurring in Florida—thus works as an operational “waiver” of the 
electorate’s right to a President chosen in conformity with the commands of the Twelfth 
Amendment. So, had Governor Bush not chosen to litigate in Florida, then perhaps none of 
the specific voters who were ostensibly affected by the method of recounting votes would 
have had standing to sue if Mr. Young’s view were adopted. One should note that his (ten-
tative) proposal is based on prudential considerations and does not claim to be derived 
from the Constitution itself. 
 In any event, the lack of a private enforcement mechanism would not render the Twelfth 
Amendment wholly “irrelevant.” It would remain binding on the conscience of individual 
electors at voting time, and a violation would presumably have been valid grounds for an 
objection when the vote tallies were transmitted to Congress. There is no evidence, of 
course, that any substantial qualms were felt at either of these points in the process. 
 47. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
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ascertaining the intent of the Framers.48 For information as to such 
intent, he turned to “dictionaries in use at the time the Twelfth 
Amendment was adopted and ratified.”49 One 1792 dictionary defined 
“inhabitants” of a locality as including “[t]hose who occupy lands 
within such town or parish, although they be dwelling elsewhere. But 
the word inhabitants doth not extend to lodgers, servants, or the like; 
but to householders only.”50 Judge Fitzwater also consulted Noah 
Webster’s famous American Dictionary of the English Language, pub-
lished in 1828, which defined “inhabitant” as a “dweller, one who 
dwells or resides permanently in a place or who has a fixed resi-
dence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger or visitor. . . . One 
who has a legal settlement in a town, city or parish.”51 According to 
Judge Fitzwater, “These definitions closely parallel the modern con-
cept of domicile,”52 which the Supreme Court has held to be estab-
lished by “physical presence in a place in connection with a certain 
state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there.”53 Thus he held 
“that a person is an ‘inhabitant’ of a state, within the meaning of the 
Twelfth Amendment, if he (1) has a physical presence within that 
state and (2) intends that it be his place of habitation.”54 
 According to Judge Fitzwater, Mr. Cheney met this requirement 
because he “has both a physical presence within the state of Wyo-
ming and the intent that Wyoming be his place of habitation.”55 To 
defend this proposition, Fitzwater begins by noting that “he was 
born, raised, educated, and married in Wyoming and represented the 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Id. at 718. There is, of course, a well-known distinction between the intent of the 
Framers, the authors of the particular words being construed, and the understanding of 
the relevant language held by the initial audience reading the words in question. See, e.g., 
Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). On oc-
casion, these can take interpreters in two quite different directions, especially if the “read-
ers” in question are presumed to be a mass rather than a professionally expert audience. 
See, for example, Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Original-
ism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000), with regard to the often rancorous debate about the 
relevance of James Madison’s specific intentions regarding the words of the Second 
Amendment and the scope of a “right to keep and bear arms.” Judge Fitzwater’s recourse 
to contemporaneous dictionaries shows a primary interest in the original understanding of 
constitutional text, rather than the subjective intent of the drafters. See Jones, 122 F. 
Supp. 2d at 719; see also id. (“The court determines the Framers’ intent from the unambi-
guous language of the Twelfth Amendment.”). In any event, there is precious little evi-
dence going to any more specific intent that the drafters might have had in mind. 
 49. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 719.  
 50. Id. (quoting RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, LAW DICTIONARY (1792) (emphasis 
added)). The Burns’ dictionary was published, of course, more than a decade before the 
Twelfth Amendment was written, though there is no reason to believe that there was a 
particular linguistic dynamism concerning “inhabitant” that makes it deficient as a source. 
 51. Id. (quoting Charles Wood, Losing Control of America’s Future: The Census, Birth-
right Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 478 (1999)). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 720. 
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state as a Member of Congress for six terms.”56 All of these observa-
tions are true, of course, but it is not remotely clear what they have 
to do with establishing current habitation. Mr. Levinson was born, 
raised, and educated in North Carolina, and he hopes that he is even 
now a fine representative of the Tarheel State, but he could not, pre-
sumably, plausibly claim to be a present “inhabitant” of that state.57 
More relevant, perhaps, is Cheney’s declaration in late July, 2000, 
that he intended to return to Wyoming; he “registered to vote there, 
requested withdrawal of his Texas voter registration, voted in Wyo-
ming in two elections, obtained a Wyoming driver’s license and sold 
his Texas house.”58 Upon his designation as the nominee for the Vice 
Presidency by the Republican Party, he informed the Secret Service 
that his primary residence was a home he owned in Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, and he “also requested that the United States Postal Ser-
vice rescind a prior order on file in Teton County, Wyoming to for-
ward mail to Dallas, Texas.”59 Left unmentioned in the opinion was 
the fact that Cheney and his wife had, according to The Washington 
Post, purchased in January, 2000, a $1.35 million home in McLean, 
Virginia.60 Indeed, when asked to “[i]dentify all real property in 
which [Cheney] own[ed] an interest,” Cheney replied that he held 
“interests in a home in Jackson Hole, Wyoming; a house in Highland 
Park, Texas; a townhouse in McLean, Virginia; and an undeveloped 
lot in McLean, Virginia.”61 He was not asked, and therefore did not 
have to answer, how many nights he had actually spent in his Wyo-
ming “home,” and it is clear that as of November 29, 2000, he had not 
been successful in selling his Highland Park home. 
 The blunt fact is that nothing supported Cheney’s assertion that 
Wyoming was now to be his “primary residence” other than his 
statement on July 21, 2000, “declar[ing] his intention to return to his 
home state of Wyoming.”62 Although Mr. Young is inclined to be a bit 
more generous in his assessment of Mr. Cheney’s sincerity than is 
Mr. Levinson,63 the timing of Cheney’s statement does implicate one 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Id. 
 57. Similarly, Mr. Young admits that he hung on to his Texas driver’s license in law 
school, probably longer than he was legally entitled to do so, mostly because he did not 
want to admit the fact that he had become an “inhabitant” of Massachusetts. 
 58. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 720. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Names & Faces, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2000, at C3 (referring to the Cheneys hav-
ing “knocked down the existing house and filed plans for the construction of a big-time 
mansion”). 
 61. Cheney’s Response to Interrogatories, supra note 36, at 7. The “undeveloped lot,” 
presumably, is the acreage on which the “big-time mansion,” Names & Faces, supra note 
60, at C3, is to be built. In the meantime, the Cheneys could fall back on the “townhouse.” 
 62. Cheney’s Response to Interrogatories, supra note 36, at 3. 
 63. Mr. Levinson would bet his ranch, if he had one, that Dick Cheney had, at the 
time of the statement, no intention of “return[ing] to his home state of Wyoming” other 
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of the central concerns of domicile and residence requirements; that 
is, to minimize incentives for opportunistic behavior.64 Whether or 
not Cheney’s resumption of voting, driver registration, and mail de-
livery in Wyoming comported with a long-term intention to return to 
his old haunts someday, the fact that these actions were taken im-
mediately surrounding his addition to the Republican ticket strongly 
suggest an immediate motivation to comply with the formal require-
ments of the Twelfth Amendment. It seems at least doubtful whether 
such behavior would be sufficient to allow Mr. Cheney to avail him-
self of the benefits of Wyoming law for purposes of taxation or family 
law—issues which also turn on concepts of “domicile.” 
 It is not at all clear, however, that “domicile” is really the right 
test. Domicile, after all, is generally a unitary concept; that is, the 
common law rule holds that “a person must have one domicile, and 
can have only one.”65 The 1792 Burns dictionary upon which Judge 
Fitzwater relied, on the other hand, seems to contemplate multiple 
places of “inhabitance.”66 That dictionary clearly seems to establish 
Cheney as an inhabitant of Texas insofar as he “dwell[s] in a house 
there,” yet it also includes “those who occupy lands within such town 
                                                                                                                    
than to enjoy respites from his busy cosmopolitan life in the Washington Beltway. Once 
again, this might simply manifest a difference in our two basic characters—Mr. Young is 
much less a devotee of what has been labeled the “hermeneutics of suspicion” than is Mr. 
Levinson—or, alas, it might be just another manifestation of the fact that Mr. Young is a 
Republican and Mr. Levinson a Democrat and that it is frustratingly impossible, at least 
when discussing the events of the 2000 election, to reach consensus on the most basic facts, 
including the good faith of Richard Cheney’s declaration of where he intended to go upon 
leaving Texas. Mr. Levinson also notes that The New York Times described Cheney as oc-
cupying his McLean “home” when he was rushed to the hospital upon suffering a mild 
heart attack on November 22, 2000. Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor’s World: In This 
Case, the Patient Had a Secret Service Escort, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at F1 (“Mr. Cheney 
asked Secret Service agents at his home in McLean, Va., to drive him to the emergency 
room . . . .”). Mr Young would point out that it seems unlikely, under the circumstances, 
that anyone from the Times actually asked Cheney whether he would confirm this charac-
terization of his residence as he was being rushed to the hospital. 
 64. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 426 (1939) (holding that a wealthy man 
“could not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for 
the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact had no residence, for the pur-
pose of taxation”); Hagan v. Hardwick, 624 P.2d 26, 27 (N.M. 1981) (“The purpose of re-
quiring domicile within the state for a specified period of time as a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to obtaining a divorce is ‘to prevent divorce-minded couples from shopping for favor-
able residence requirements.’”). Such requirements may serve other governmental inter-
ests as well, such as the need to avoid interjurisidictional conflicts or to further specific 
state regulatory interests. A state may use a unitary concept like domicile, for example, to 
ensure that only one jurisdiction will assert authority over a divorce proceeding, and that 
jurisdiction will in fact be the state with substantive interests in regulating related issues 
such as disposition of the family’s property or custody of the children. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975). These concerns, however, seem to have no direct analog in the 
context of presidential and vice-presidential elections. 
 65. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. at 429 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 427 
(majority opinion) (stating that a person’s “preeminent headquarters . . . is the essence of 
technical domicile”).  
 66. BURN & BURN, supra note 50, at 719. 
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or parish, although they be dwelling elsewhere.”67 Many persons to-
day have residences in more than one state and, therefore, would 
seem to be able to claim the status of “inhabitant” of multiple states. 
It may be that in law one can “inhabit” only one state, just as, in law, 
one can be a domiciliary of only one state, but that is surely not an 
analytic truth. Indeed, Dick Cheney might well be regarded, at the 
time of his election, as an inhabitant of three states: Texas, Wyoming, 
and Virginia. 
 Webster, writing a full quarter-century after the framing of the 
Twelfth Amendment (and four decades after the original use of the 
relevant language in Article II), requires that one “dwells or resides 
permanently in a place or . . . has a fixed residence . . . .”68 He was ob-
viously writing in a far different world, vastly removed from the so-
phisticated, multistate or, indeed, multinational, one in which many 
of us find ourselves, where the notions of “permanence” or “fixity” are 
fodder for deconstructive analysis.69 A person with homes in Wyo-
ming, Virginia, Texas (and, now, the District of Columbia, even if the 
last one is provided by the United States taxpayers) can as easily be 
said to be “inhabiting” all of these places or none of them. (The latter 
is what is meant by referring to a person as a “rootless cosmopoli-
tan.”) There is certainly no particular reason to pick out only one of 
these states or places and say that one is an inhabitant only of that 
place and no other. 
 One might, of course, accept our analysis in its entirety and say 
that the Twelfth Amendment is best interpreted as requiring that at 
least one candidate receiving one’s votes be an inhabitant of a state 
other than the elector’s own, even if that candidate also inhabits the 
elector’s (and the other recipient’s) state. Thus, it could be argued, 
Texas electors can vote for both Bush and Cheney because Cheney, 
though an inhabitant of Texas, also inhabits at least one additional 
state. Or, of course, one might read the Habitation Clause more re-
strictively and say that the vote is invalid if the second candidate, 
though an inhabitant of another state as well, also inhabits the first 
candidate’s (and the elector’s) state.  
 The text of the Amendment itself seems marginally to favor the 
more restrictive reading. It says, after all, that the elector’s choice of 
at least one candidate “shall not be an inhabitant of the same state 
with themselves”;70 if the drafters had intended to be more permis-
sive, they could have said that one candidate “must be an inhabitant 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Id.  
 68. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 69. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. at 429 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In the 
setting of modern circumstances, the inflexible doctrine of domicile—one man, one home—
is in danger of becoming a social anachronism.”).  
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added). 
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of a state other than the elector’s own.”  
 Surely neither reading is absolutely compelled, and an analysis of 
the Amendment’s underlying purpose (to the extent that we can dis-
cern it at all) mostly serves to confirm that the question is very close. 
If the purpose was to prevent single-state dominance of the Execu-
tive, then one might require that electors vote for at least one candi-
date with no significant ties to their own state. If, on the other hand, 
the idea is to ensure that at least one vote is cast for a “national 
character,”71 then “rootless cosmopolitans” like Dick Cheney, with 
strong ties to several different states, might be exactly what the 
Framers were looking for. As we have said, we purport to offer no de-
finitive resolution to this question here, in part because the two of us 
might well disagree as to that resolution. The important point—upon 
which we do agree—is that the question is a serious and close one.  
 There certainly appears to be a plausible basis not only for the 
lawsuit that was filed, but also for an objection by members of Con-
gress when the electoral votes were counted on January 5, 2001, and 
Texas was announced as having cast its votes for both Bush and 
Cheney. There was, obviously, no such challenge, and, as noted ear-
lier, there was almost no attention paid to the lawsuit. We now turn 
to some explanations for this “Dangerfieldian” lack of respect. 
B.   Is the Twelfth Amendment Too Technical? 
 If we assume that the argument for a Twelfth Amendment viola-
tion is at least plausible—and the rest of this Part won’t be very in-
teresting if we don’t—then what explains the lack of public outcry 
over Mr. Cheney’s candidacy and election to the Vice Presidency? 
Consider, for example, the likely reaction if the Texas electors had 
been chosen pursuant to a state law providing that “[n]o candidate 
for the office of presidential elector shall be a member of the African-
American race.” Would we treat a claim that the Texas electors 
should be thrown out under the Equal Protection Clause the way we 
have treated the Twelfth Amendment argument? We doubt it. An ob-
vious reason for this is that almost everyone—including most law-
yers—believes that equal protection concerns are simply more impor-
                                                                                                                    
 71. Madison argued in Federalist 10, for example, that one advantage of the extended 
republic would be to encourage voters “to centre on men who possess the most attractive 
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added). According to Garry Wills, 
“Madison is saying that escape from local prejudice will allow men to vote for those whose 
reputation is not only established but reaches out across larger stretches of the extended 
republic.” GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 232 (2d ed. 2001). Gordon 
Wood describes the Federalist theory of representation in a large republic as being de-
signed to filter out people of narrow parochial interests. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 506-18 (1969).  
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tant than Twelfth Amendment concerns. Persons who evoke the 
Fourteenth Amendment are serious; advocates of the relevance of the 
Twelfth Amendment, instead, are merely cranks. 
 Why that would be so presents a series of questions that we think 
should interest anyone interested in the practices of constitutional 
argumentation, including, of course, the practices by which some ar-
guments are taken seriously while others are subject to disdainful 
dismissal. There are certainly some plausible reasons to treat all 
constitutional violations as equally worthy of concern.72 One of the 
more awkward realities of the Constitution is that it contains no list-
ing of priorities—no set of rules providing that, for example, one con-
stitutional provision should trump another in the event of a conflict.73 
One might take the decision to include a particular provision in the 
Constitution itself, rather than simply in a statute, as evidence that 
the People view the provision as having surpassing—and enduring—
importance.74 And powerful rule-of-law concerns militate against the 
proposition that state actors ought to be able to ignore some parts of 
the Constitution on the ground that those parts really aren’t all that 
important. The very point of a written constitution, one might think, 
is to put such arguments off limits to the governmental officials who 
are bound by the document’s requirements. Indeed, as Marshall 
                                                                                                                    
 72. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 267 (1992) (“[W]e 
should take the whole Constitution seriously. We cannot legitimately pick and choose the 
clauses we want enforced.”).  
 73. The closest the Constitution even arguably comes to that is the relationship be-
tween the Reconstruction Amendments and certain constitutional guarantees of state 
autonomy, such as the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976) (recognizing Congress’s authority to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity pursuant to Congress’s power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). Some scholars have suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment simply makes indi-
vidual rights more “important” than federalism. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking 
State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 544 (1985). But the effect of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment on preexisting federalism guarantees is usually explained in terms of its ratifiers’ in-
tent to amend prior constitutional provisions. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (noting that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions “themselves embody significant limitations on 
state authority”). No one has suggested, to our knowledge, that subsequent constitutional 
provisions have amended the Twelfth Amendment. And although we will suggest later on 
that the Twelfth Amendment is in fact a federalism provision, see infra text accompanying 
notes 111-14, it is one that limits state power. It would thus be strange to say that the 
Twelfth Amendment is one of the constitutional provisions subordinated by the Recon-
struction Amendments. 
 74. But see Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 920-21 (1986) (observing that certain pillars of our federal system, such 
as the rule of Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874) (establishing state court control over 
the substantive content of state law), may be statutory rather than constitutional in na-
ture). One might similarly argue that certain federal statutory rights—such as the right to 
equal treatment by private actors regardless of race or gender enshrined in the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act—have become more central to the lives of the citizenry than many constitu-
tional rights. Nonetheless, no one would suggest that these statutes could actually super-
sede constitutional text. 
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thundered in Marbury v. Madison, it is precisely because the limits 
established by the Constitution “not be mistaken, or forgotten, [that] 
the constitution is written.”75 And, he asks, “[t]o what purpose are 
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended 
to be restrained?”76 
 And yet, as we all know, constitutional provisions are like the 
animals in George Orwell’s barnyard: some are considerably more 
equal than others.77 Those deemed legal adepts view constitutional 
violations as serious in some areas, less so in others.78 Or, perhaps 
more to the point, these adepts interpret possibly embarrassing pro-
visions in ways that “neutralize” their potentially discomforting im-
pact.79 So what is it about the Twelfth Amendment that makes it a 
“second class” constitutional provision? 
 One possibility is that it is too technical. We are used to speaking, 
after all, of the “grand generalities” of the Constitution—ringing 
phrases like “equal protection of the laws” or “due process of law.” 
Perhaps our most closely cherished constitutional restrictions on 
government—the free speech, press, and religion clauses of the First 
Amendment—are combined in a single textual sentence. Indeed, 
some of the other basic rights that would surely figure on most citi-
                                                                                                                    
 75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).  
 76. Id. 
 77. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd. 1945). 
 78. We acknowledge a connection here to claims that, in many areas, our legal culture 
has been overlooking blatant constitutional violations for years. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, 
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (arguing that 
the modern administrative state violates any number of basic structural restraints on gov-
ernment). The response to such claims—under the delegation doctrine, for example—has 
typically been to construe the relevant constitutional constraints in such a way as to give 
the government broad latitude. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457 
(2001). Whether or not such interpretations are persuasive, we see two important differ-
ences from the Twelfth Amendment situation. First, constitutional arguments such as the 
nondelegation challenge to the administrative state are often acknowledged to be serious, 
even if most would agree that it is too late to do anything about them. But see id. at 487 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (suggesting that the nondelegation 
concern should be frankly jettisoned by the courts). Second, we think there is a difference 
between a willingness to interpret constitutional restrictions in a strained way in order to 
reject a constitutional challenge, on the one hand, and a refusal, on the other, to engage in 
such interpretation in the first place on the ground that the constitutional challenge sim-
ply isn’t very important. We think it is more accurate to characterize the general reaction 
to the Twelfth Amendment problem arising out of Mr. Cheney’s candidacy in the latter 
way, even though the courts and scholars that have actually been willing to focus on the is-
sue have generally taken the former approach. The interesting problem, as we see it, is 
precisely that so few courts and commentators have bothered to take the problem seriously 
at all. 
 79. Perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon is the “neutralization” of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism 
Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000). 
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zens’ “top ten” list—the right to privacy,80 “one man, one vote,”81 the 
right not to be convicted of a crime absent proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt82—take up no textual space at all. The phrases of the 
Twelfth Amendment, on the other hand, hardly roll trippingly off the 
tongue. It took nearly a full page of this Essay to reproduce the 
Amendment in its entirety, and in all that text there are no memora-
ble phrases. One can hardly imagine schoolchildren reciting how 
“[t]he Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot 
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be 
an inhabitant of the same state with themselves.”83 
 We suspect that, while it’s easier for a catchy phrase like “free 
speech” to stick in the public memory, the underlying problem is not 
really one of linguistic structure at all. Rather, the trouble goes to 
what the different provisions purport to do. The provisions of the Bill 
of Rights, for example, articulate basic individual liberties. The 
Twelfth Amendment, by contrast, offers a laundry list of technicali-
ties for administering presidential and vice-presidential elections. It 
is tempting to assume that it has almost no connection with realizing 
the inspiring purposes of the Constitution outlined in the Preamble 
and, for many analysts, instantiated in the Bill of Rights. This is 
mistaken. 
 Both the Twelfth Amendment and the First Amendment, for ex-
ample, are ultimately designed to safeguard liberty, but there are 
obvious differences in the ways that the two provisions go about it. 
The First Amendment identifies a core freedom and bans govern-
ment interference directly, while the Twelfth Amendment contrib-
utes to a complex scheme of institutional checks and balances which, 
by indirection, seek to establish the conditions for liberty. It is not 
surprising that the former is easier to comprehend, and therefore to 
feel strongly about. The interesting thing about this reaction, how-
ever, is that it is diametrically opposed to the strategy employed by 
the Framers. The Federalists envisioned a structure of separated 
powers, checks and balances, and federalism—a complex web of po-
litical and institutional checks —with virtually no explicit protection 
for specific individual rights.84 Get the structure right, the Federal-
ists thought, and you foreclose the ability of government to behave in 
a tyrannical way. The Framers’ central concern was thus, as Madison 
                                                                                                                    
 80. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 81. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 82. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  
 84. See generally Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 1349 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers] (sketching the political theory of Feder-
alist 10 and 51); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard 
of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001) (explaining how the institutional safeguards of 
federalism protect individual liberty).  
946  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:925 
 
explained in Federalist No. 51, to “contriv[e] the interior structure of 
the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their 
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places.”85 Thus the Framers devised a “policy of supplying, by oppo-
site and rival interests, the defect of better motives,” that is, a gov-
ernment “where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other—
that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over 
the public rights.”86 Direct limitations on the powers of government, 
by contrast, stood as mere “parchment barriers” to usurpation.87 
 The Twelfth Amendment is just the sort of provision one would 
expect in a Constitution predicated on institutional and political 
checks. The Electoral College, which the Amendment reaffirms, was 
designed as a filtering mechanism to moderate the influence of popu-
lar democracy in the selection of the Chief Executive. The College, as 
well as the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Amendment 
for close elections, preserved a role for the States in the selection of 
the Chief Executive.88 And the Habitation Clause’s prohibition on 
electors voting for two persons from their same state most plausibly 
seems designed not only to make it substantially more difficult for 
any single state to dominate the Executive Branch, but also to fore-
stall the constitutional crises that might arise were the Electoral Col-
lege unable to make a decisive choice.89 Each of these aspects of the 
Amendment—like the Constitution’s other structural safeguards of 
federalism and separation of powers—protects freedom by indirec-
tion; that is, by creating the conditions for limited government rather 
than prescribing particular things that government may not do. 
 To be sure, the Twelfth Amendment’s contribution to the Consti-
tution’s structure of institutional checks and balances is less familiar 
than that made by other provisions, such as Article V’s guarantee of 
equal state suffrage in the Senate or Article I’s provisions governing 
how a bill becomes a law. And we will ask in Part III.C., below, 
whether the particular structural concerns addressed by the 
Amendment’s “different states” requirement have any continuing 
relevance today. Our point is simply that the “technical” nature of 
the “different state” requirement is quite consistent with the Fram-
ers’ more general emphasis on protecting liberty through institu-
                                                                                                                    
 85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 86. Id. at 322. 
 87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 88. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 557 (1954). 
 89. Id. 
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tional mechanisms rather than explicit recognition of particular 
rights. 
 Does the widespread lack of concern over Dick Cheney’s potential 
unconstitutionality signal a more general shift away from the Fram-
ers’ structural vision? It’s hard to say for sure, of course, but there is 
plenty other evidence of the ascendancy in recent decades of “rights 
talk” over “structure talk” in much of our constitutional discourse. 
The leading casebooks on constitutional law, for example, devote 
dramatically more pages to the Constitution’s individual rights pro-
visions than they do to constitutional structure,90 notwithstanding 
the resurgence of aggressive judicial review on the structure side in 
recent years. The Supreme Court’s record is more mixed, of course; 
the Court has been willing to enforce the “technical” procedural rules 
for Congressional lawmaking with some vigor,91 and in recent years 
it moved to reinvigorate federalism-based limitations on the national 
legislative power as well.92 The vehement criticism of the latter set of 
decisions from most academics, especially those identified as political 
liberals reflects, among other things, the continuing domination in 
the legal academy of the belief that constitutional law, especially if 
defined in terms of judicial handiwork, ought primarily to be about 
the direct protection of individual rights rather than the mainte-
nance of particular governmental structures.93 
 It is not our brief to commend or criticize this view today (even if 
the two of us could agree on the issue, which seems unlikely).94 We 
                                                                                                                    
 90. For example, the STONE ET AL. casebook, which is said to be the most widely used 
casebook in American law schools, devotes approximately 1,200 pages to individual rights, 
compared to almost 500 pages on structure. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996). Nor is the apparent runner-up, the Gunther & Sulli-
van casebook, very different. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997) (Part III, “Individual Rights,” is 838 pages long; Part 
II, “The Structure of Government,” takes up only 327 pages).    
 91. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the line-item 
veto as contrary to the lawmaking procedure set out in Article I); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983) (striking down the legislative veto for similar reasons). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Vio-
lence Against Women Act as outside Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as outside the commerce power). 
 93. For a classic statement of this theme, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (1980) (urging that the Court abandon judicial review of federalism and 
separation of powers issues and conserve its political capital for enforcing guarantees of 
individual rights). 
 94. Mr. Levinson’s fulminations against the Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence 
are primarily confined to his contributions to an Internet discussion group among profes-
sors of constitutional law. It may be worth noting, incidentally, that although Mr. Young 
applauds Lopez, see Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federal-
ism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2, both Mr. Levinson and Mr. Young agree that the Court’s cur-
rent set of doctrines concerning federal jurisdiction, the reach of the Commerce Clause, 
conditional federal spending, and preemption makes little sense if one sees them as at-
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do, however, want to make one observation about the relationship 
between this shift in the emphasis of constitutional law and the in-
stitution of judicial review. The Constitution’s structural provisions 
are primarily directed toward establishing a system that allows dif-
ferent parts of the political branches to check one another. The aim, 
as Madison said, is to “oblige [the government] to control itself.”95 Ju-
dicial review in this context focuses on whether the procedural and 
structural mechanisms built into the framework have been obeyed—
that is, whether a legislative enactment has been presented to the 
President, or whether candidate Cheney is really an inhabitant of 
Wyoming. And while the instances of judicial review in this context 
tend to be big, important cases, they happen relatively infrequently. 
The structure is designed, after all, to be generally self-enforcing.96 
 Structural judicial review generally does not put particular poli-
cies off limits to political actors. Instead, it decides which political ac-
tors can pursue a particular policy, or requires those actors to follow 
certain procedures. As Judge Wilkinson has observed of federalism 
litigation: 
[O]ur role . . . is not as substantive adjudicators, but as structural 
referees. The due process decisions of the Lochner and Warren 
Court eras, as well as the individual rights rulings of the latter, at-
tempted to remove the subject matter of those cases from political 
debate altogether. Those decisions prevented the people from seek-
ing resolutions of their differences through their popularly elected 
representatives—federal and state. By contrast, the present juris-
prudence of federalism is purely allocative. . . . This jurisprudence 
removes no substantive decision from the stage of political de-
bate.97 
 Judicial review on ultimate questions of rights strikes us as 
somewhat different. The doctrinal formulations in many of these ar-
eas explicitly call for an evaluation of the government’s interest in 
pursuing a particular measure in comparison with the impact of the 
measure on individual liberty.98 And decisions under the Constitu-
tion’s rights provisions frequently put particular policies off limits to 
government, no matter which institutions pursue them or what pro-
                                                                                                                    
tempting genuinely to create a coherent vision of the role of states in the modern United 
States. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 84. 
 95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 85, at 322. 
 96. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 84. 
 97. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 895 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring), aff’d, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 98.  See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (evaluating what state inter-
ests “count” in restricting abortion and which restrictions impose an “undue burden” on the 
abortion right); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that the state had no 
“legitimate” interest in restricting enactment of pro-gay civil rights measures at the local 
level).  
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cedures are employed.99 Rights decisions thus set the federal courts 
up as the final arbiters of government policy in a way that structural 
decisions generally do not. 
 It would be easy, of course, to overstate the contrast we have just 
described. Certainly some forms of structural review—most obvi-
ously, efforts to enforce the nondelegation doctrine or the limits of 
the Commerce Clause—may require the courts to pass directly on 
particular governmental policies.100 And not all claims of individual 
right have the effect of putting a particular government policy off-
limits. Equal protection claims, for instance, typically give the gov-
ernment a choice between imposing a particular restriction on all 
similarly situated persons or not imposing the restriction at all. We 
nonetheless think it is fair to suggest that structural review—
especially under the more “technical” of the Constitution’s structural 
provisions—takes place at a further remove from the policy choices 
underlying a governmental act than is the case in litigation focused 
on individual rights. Nothing in the arguments we have sketched 
concerning Mr. Cheney, for example, legitimates considering the sort 
of policies he would pursue once he assumed office. 
 We thus think modern constitutional law’s preference for rights 
over structure as the primary safeguard of liberty entails a view 
about the relative importance of judicial review in the overall 
scheme. Courts no longer sit merely to enforce governmental rules of 
the road that, in turn, require governmental institutions to control 
                                                                                                                    
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (striking down federal 
statute barring flag burning that was passed in an effort to respond to constitutional con-
cerns expressed in a prior court decision); cf. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, 
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1594 
(2000) (observing that most constitutional review takes the form of “invalidation norms” 
that act as absolute prohibitions on certain sorts of government action). Even in these ar-
eas, however, judicial invalidation merely states which actors can pursue a policy—not 
which policies may be pursued. In Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), for exam-
ple, the Court entertained a nondelegation challenge to the military death penalty. The 
question was whether Congress must specify the “aggravating factors” upon which a court 
martial could sentence a convicted murderer to death or whether Congress could delegate 
that task to the President; importantly, however, the case involved no inquiry as to what 
sort of factors were permissible as a matter of substantive constitutional law. Similarly, 
the Court’s invalidation of the federal Gun Free School Zones Act in United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), did not prevent the states from forbidding gun possession at school, 
see id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “over 40 States already have crimi-
nal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds”), or even prevent 
Congress from regulating the same conduct through other means, see, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, 
Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) (discussing how Con-
gress could use the Spending Power to evade the limits imposed by the Court in Lopez). 
 100. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting) (likening Commerce 
Clause review to the substantive policy judgments involved in Lochner-era economic sub-
stantive due process cases); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine is not enforceable by courts be-
cause enforcement would involve the courts in policy judgments). 
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each other; rather, courts seek to control the government directly 
through judicial enforcement of individual rights. If this is right, 
then judicial enforcement of provisions like the Habitation Clause 
would be less an example of judicial activism than a look back toward 
a theory of government in which such activism is less central to the 
constitutional scheme.101 And, of course, one need not speak only of 
judicial enforcement; even if, as will be discussed below, one thinks 
that courts have little useful role to play in adjudicating electoral col-
lege disputes, that still leaves Congress with its own duties of consti-
tutional fidelity, including adherence to the Habitation Clause.  
C.   Does the Habitation Clause Serve Any Worthwhile Values? 
 Even if we are not willing to junk the idea of structural protec-
tions altogether, one might argue that certain structural provisions—
like the Habitation Clause—no longer protect, or guard against, any-
thing particularly significant. The Clause is, if not a “stupid” part of 
the Constitution, a hopelessly irrelevant one in today’s cosmopolitan 
world, and only a fanatic would want it taken seriously today. Dick 
Cheney (and Judge Fitzwater) demonstrated how to neutralize any 
practical import it might have, and, from this perspective, they might 
be performing a public service in having done so. One would think, 
after all, that the response of the mass public to the invalidation of 
Texas’s vote on Habitation Clause grounds would have been outraged 
disbelief, if not indeed rioting in the streets.102 People care about who 
they want for President (and Vice President),103 while we suspect that 
almost no one today believes that the Habitation Clause serves any 
important value. 
 This sort of obsolescence is, as we have already suggested, 
scarcely unprecedented in our constitutional history. The Constitu-
tion, for example, seems quite clearly to prohibit any and all “im-
pairments” of contract by states.104 This textual detail—or the rich 
historical evidence that the Framers indeed intended that states be 
                                                                                                                    
 101. Of course, “judicial activism” is itself notoriously hard to define. See generally Wil-
liam P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2002); Ernest A. Young, Activism, Conservatism, and the Federalist Revival, 
73 COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
 102. Mr. Young is, in general, less worried about the likelihood of rioting in the streets 
or other forms of political violence than is Mr. Levinson. As we have suggested earlier, the 
context of the 2000 election is quite different from that of 1800, when state officials threat-
ened to use force to ensure the acknowledgment of Thomas Jefferson as President. See 
Freeman, supra note 7, at 1963. But cf. Bob Herbert, In America: Riots, Then and Now, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001, at A25 (discussing recent riots in Cincinnati). 
 103. As a matter of fact, one might omit the parenthetical, given that “there is little 
evidence to suggest that vice presidents add greatly to or detract severely from the popu-
larity of presidential candidates with the voters.” NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON 
WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 156 (10th ed. 1988). 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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strongly restrained in their ability to pass debtor-relief legislation—
proved unavailing in the Blaisdell case,105 where Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, for a five-Justice majority, upheld the so-
called Minnesota mortgage moratorium that was a conceded impair-
ment of contract. The reasoning seemed, at the end of the day, pru-
dential: the United States Supreme Court simply could not afford, at 
the height of the Great Depression, to treat the Contract Clause as if 
it really meant what a dictionary might suggest it said. (“What part 
of ‘no’ do you not understand?,” as we might put it today, in a decid-
edly different context.) And so the Court offered a more flexible read-
ing of the Contract Clause that allowed Minnesota’s action. 
 One might object that Blaisdell hardly found the economic values 
of commercial stability embodied in the Contract Clause irrelevant; 
rather, the Court in effect found that the Framers were profoundly 
mistaken as to the relationship between prohibiting all debt relief 
and preserving economic stability.106 One might make a similar ar-
gument about the Second Amendment: The problem is hardly that 
private gun ownership is irrelevant these days—just that it’s too dan-
gerous for many of us to condone, constitutionally protected or not.107 
Both the relevance and dangerousness arguments share a common 
feature, however. They both rely on an argument that the constitu-
tional value is profoundly out of step with modern concerns. 
 Do we really think the Habitation Clause is similarly out of step 
with the times? We have suggested that the Clause was designed to 
serve two important functions—preventing single-state dominance of 
the Electoral College and helping to ensure that the College will be 
able to make a decisive choice. These concerns hardly seem relics of a 
hazy past. Concerns about dominance of a particular issue by a sin-
gle state continue to crop up in our discourse. We sometimes worry, 
for instance, that elimination of the Electoral College would lead to 
large-state dominance of presidential elections;108 that Delaware has 
                                                                                                                    
 105. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 106. The Court in Blaisdell stated that: 
Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or 
of classes were involved [with regard to debt relief], and that those of the State 
itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental 
interests of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer 
merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of rea-
sonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all 
depends.  
Id. at 442. 
 107. See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 48, at 103. 
 108. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Should the Electoral College Stay or Go? It Has Served Us 
Well by Giving All States a Voice and Should Be Retained, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 19, 
2000, at 1H (arguing that abolition of the Electoral College would lead to dominance by 
large states). 
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achieved an unhealthy dominance of corporate law;109 or that Cali-
fornia cases unfairly dominate the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.110 
And in the context of the 2000 election itself, it is hard to describe as 
completely unreasonable the worry that electing both a President 
and a Vice President from the same oil-producing state would lead to 
untoward influences on energy policy. So although the risk that a 
single state might dominate all aspects of our national life seems re-
mote today, the sorts of concerns embodied in the Habitation Clause 
seem to have some continuing currency. 
 Likewise with the concern for decisive electoral choice. Does any-
one want to go through the month of November 2000 again, regard-
less of how one feels about the outcome? We didn’t think so. To the 
extent that the Habitation Clause is designed to prevent similar 
sorts of indecision—albeit at a later point in the process—it surely 
promotes values that continue to be relevant today. 
 Given the continuing significance of these concerns, we suspect 
that lack of interest in the Habitation Clause stems from a view that 
the Clause itself does relatively little, under current conditions, to 
prevent single-state dominance or to ensure decisive choice. The rea-
son may be a general decline, or at least perceived decline, in the sig-
nificance of loyalties to one’s home state. It’s not, in other words, that 
we don’t worry about large-state hegemony; it’s just that we don’t ex-
pect the election of public officials who happened to live in a particu-
lar state to bring about that result. Similarly, we don’t tend to worry 
about the “favorite son” phenomenon posing an obstacle to decisive 
electoral choice in the same way that the Framers did two centuries 
ago. More generally, we tend to view a figure like Dick Cheney at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century as a “citizen of the Nation” 
rather than a particular state; we worry much more about what he’s 
for than where he’s from. 
 If this hypothesis about a decline in home-state loyalties is cor-
rect—it would be awfully hard to test empirically in a meaningful 
way—then it might have interesting implications for broader debates 
in constitutional law. In particular, Mark Tushnet has suggested 
that the Cheney episode calls into question the value of federalism, 
which the Supreme Court has been busily protecting in recent 
years.111 If people don’t care about the states enough to favor them 
                                                                                                                    
 109. E.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 841-52 (1995) (suggesting that Delaware’s dominance of corporate law 
may be unhealthy). 
 110. E.g., Book Note, Will a Split in Time Save the Ninth?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 794, 799 
n.21 (1991) (noting recurring concerns about California’s dominance of Ninth Circuit case 
law). 
 111. See E-mail from Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center, to Sanford Levinson (Oct. 7, 2001) (on file with authors) (confirm-
ing position taken in earlier correspondence). 
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when elected to national office, Professor Tushnet suggests, why 
should the Court care about the states either? If we are all “citizens 
of the nation,” why impose federalism limits on national power?112 
 Interestingly enough, however, the argument can also run the 
other way. One might answer Professor Tushnet by insisting that the 
states exist not for their own sake, but rather to protect individual 
liberty by standing as an “intermediary body” between the individual 
and the national government.113 On this view, we need the states to 
fulfill their institutional role whether people feel, as an individual 
matter, strong loyalty to them or not. At that point, a judgment that 
federal officials do not generally feel loyalty to their home states 
would serve primarily to discredit reliance on the “political safe-
guards of federalism,” which generally posits that the loyalty of fed-
eral representatives to their home states makes judicial protection of 
the states’ interests unnecessary.114 
 It might be, however, that lack of interest in the Habitation 
Clause stems from a less basic source. That is, one might accept that 
state loyalties continue to play a role in national politics, and yet still 
believe that there are sufficient political incentives to avoid the 
same-state tickets that the Habitation Clause seeks to prevent. Mr. 
Bush’s selection of Mr. Cheney, after all, raised some eyebrows by 
seemingly ignoring the conventional wisdom that a running mate 
should be chosen primarily on his ability to deliver an important 
state other than that of the presidential nominee.115 If such political 
incentives tend, by and large, to check same-state candidacies, then 
one might not worry so much if those incentives were overcome in 
particular cases. 
 In any event, we seek only to raise these questions—not to resolve 
them. It ought to be clear, however, that the Twelfth Amendment 
and its nonenforcement raise issues that sweep much more broadly 
than the controversy over Dick Cheney’s candidacy. The episode re-
quires us to ask ourselves what we actually value in the Constitu-
tion, and why. The answers to those questions are likely to perva-
                                                                                                                    
 112. One might call this the “Tinkerbell” argument. That is, if the states are fading 
away—like Tinkerbell—because no one believes in them anymore, then the protection of 
federalism is hardly a worthwhile concern for the federal courts. 
 113. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 84.  
 114. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Wechsler, supra note 88, at 543. 
 115. See David Von Drehle, A Selection That Signals Caution and Confidence: Old 
Hand, Not a New Direction, WASH. POST, July 26, 2000, at A12. The article stated, “[i]t’s 
true that Cheney makes little sense as a running mate according to most of the conven-
tional ways of sizing up the pick. His political base is in Wyoming, whose measly three 
electoral votes are dependably Republican already. . . . [Bush] said as much in introducing 
his running mate yesterday in Austin. ‘I didn’t pick Dick Cheney because of Wyoming’s 
three electoral votes.’” Id. 
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sively shape our views across the entire universe of constitutional 
questions. 
IV.   TEXT, PRUDENCE, AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE “POLITICAL 
QUESTION”; OR, WHY, EXACTLY, IS THE SUPREME COURT  
BETTER SUITED THAN CONGRESS TO PICK PRESIDENTS?116 
 As a matter of fact, both of us became interested in the Habitation 
Clause issue last summer, and we resolved then to write something 
about it together. Needless to say, we did not act on that resolution 
because, inevitably, other commitments took precedence. Our invita-
tion to this symposium then gave us the perfect occasion for writing 
the piece as initially envisioned, and you have just read it. But, of 
course, what generated this symposium is not the arcana of the 
Habitation Clause, but, rather, a host of issues raised by the 2000 
election, of which Dick Cheney’s habitation was almost literally the 
least significant. The Twelfth Amendment is scarcely irrelevant to 
these other issues, and we thus find ourselves going on from our 
original subject to three others presented by the Amendment. First, 
as suggested by the title to this section, should it be read as a “textu-
ally demonstrable commitment” to Congress to resolve any disputes 
linked with selecting the President or Vice President? Second, as-
suming that the House of Representatives, instead of the Supreme 
Court, gets to choose the President, is there anything to be said for 
the one-state, one-vote rule that structures the choice? That in turn 
suggests a third question, linked with a different part of the Consti-
tution: is there any reason to believe that the Twelfth Amendment’s 
dysfunctional features can be successfully amended, or does Article V 
doom us to a political life permanently lived under its shadow? 
A.   Textual Commitment, Manageable Standards,  
and the “Political Question” Doctrine 
 Even the most ardent proponents of judicial review must ac-
knowledge, as a descriptive matter, that not every constitutional con-
troversy is subject to judicial resolution. As Mark Graber is in the 
process of demonstrating,117 Alexis de Tocqueville was simply wrong 
when he suggested that “[t]here is hardly a political question in the 
                                                                                                                    
 116. It should be noted that the formulation of Part IV’s question stated in the text is 
Mr. Levinson’s. There is, of course, a certain tendentiousness to the formulation. Mr. 
Young would prefer “resolve electoral disputes,” but tenure ought to count for something. 
The difference between the two formulations, of course, illustrates the difficulties pre-
sented by trying to develop a “neutral and detached” vocabulary with regard to the events 
of November and December 2000. 
 117. See Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Questions: Toc-
queville’s Thesis Revisited, Address before the American Political Science Association, 
Washington D.C. (Sept. 2000). This is part of a larger work in progress by Graber. 
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United States that does not sooner or later turn into a judicial 
one.”118 The Supreme Court decided relatively little of genuine impor-
tance in the first years of the new nation, though, obviously, it grew 
to play a considerably more significant role in American political life 
in the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century. Still, there are a 
variety of crucial issues about which the Court maintains a more-or-
less determined silence insofar as they are deemed “nonjusticiable.” 
In Marbury itself, the Court acknowledged that “[q]uestions in their 
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submit-
ted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”119 Likewise, 
the Court has acknowledged that some political questions are consti-
tutionally dedicated to the legislative branch and similarly nonjusti-
ciable in a federal court.120 
 The obvious “political question” argument in Bush v. Gore is ex-
emplified (albeit with the benefit of hindsight) by the famous (or in-
famous) broadside signed by over 600 legal academics and published 
in The New York Times.121 That missive accused the Justices of hav-
ing behaved like a “political body,” not a court, in determining the 
outcome of the election. The text of the Twelfth Amendment, how-
ever, provides a more specific argument against the Court’s decision 
                                                                                                                    
 118. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., 1966). A NEXIS search for this quotation between November 8, 2000, and December 
31, 2000, found twenty-eight citations. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, How We Got Here; The Votes 
Are All In, but the Campaign Has Shifted Into the Courts. Now They Can Tell Us Who Won, 
TIME, Nov. 27, 2000, at 48; K.A. Dilday, The Election; De Tocqueville Saw it Coming, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at 4; Toby Harnden, Split in Supreme Court Reflects Divided Nation, 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 2000, at 10; Impasse: Courts Play Critical Role, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2000, at A26; The Supreme Court Issue, the Nation, 271 THE 
NATION 10 (Oct. 9, 2000). 
 119. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 120. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the Court could 
not review the constitutionality of procedures employed by the Senate to try a judicial im-
peachment). 
 121. Mr. Levinson was a signatory of that letter. Mr. Young (who definitely did not 
sign) is confident that Mr. Levinson’s many other good works, kindness to children, and 
friendliness to dogs and cats, will spare him from eternal torment on account of that single 
unfortunate act. Mr. Levinson’s current views about that letter are spelled out in Jack M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Pro-
fessors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 73 (2001). Suffice it to say that what most 
troubles him about the letter is not its accusatory tone with regard to the Supreme Court. 
But see Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 
U. COLO. L. REV. 911 (2001) (taking academics to task for their own appearances of parti-
sanship in reacting to Bush v. Gore), but, rather, the last sentence of the letter, in which its 
signatories professed to base their views on their “dedicat[ion] to the rule of law.” Levinson 
has significant problems in knowing either precisely what “the rule of law” entails or, even 
more importantly, precisely why one would necessarily be dedicated to it. See SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (discussing tension between constitutional and 
moral norms); see also CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra 
note 1, a book predicated on the assumption that mindless admiration for every constitu-
tional norm makes no sense. Needless to say, these latter sentiments are the sort of thing 
that make Mr. Young need to take a quiet walk around the block. 
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to decide the case. That Amendment provides a detailed procedure 
for resolving disputed presidential elections, and nowhere does it 
mention courts. 
 In discussing the justiciability of Bush v. Gore, it will help to dis-
tinguish between a “strong” and a “weak” version of the political 
question doctrine. The strong version holds that certain challenges to 
government action simply cannot be heard by the courts, whether or 
not those challenges have merit. The weak version, on the other 
hand, stems from Louis Henkin’s assertion that no “political ques-
tion” doctrine per se exists.122 In Professor Henkin’s view, most refus-
als to adjudicate based on “political question” grounds really rest on 
the conclusion that the substantive provisions of the Constitution 
have simply not been violated in the given case. The judgment that a 
claim under a particular provision involves a “political question,” in 
other words, is more accurately described as a judgment that that 
provision grants sufficiently broad discretion to the governmental ac-
tors involved that no constitutional violation can be made out.123 
 At least until the Court’s recent decision in the Nixon case, it 
would have been hard to find applications of the political question 
doctrine that could not be explained under the weak theory. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has insisted—at least as a matter of 
rhetoric—on a sharp distinction between these two approaches. Jus-
tice Stevens, for example, recently wrote that “[i]n invoking the po-
litical question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a 
constitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a de-
cision is of course very different from determining that specific con-
gressional action does not violate the Constitution.”124 The facts of 
Bush v. Gore provide a ready context for getting at whether this dis-
tinction actually holds up. 
                                                                                                                    
 122. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 
(1976). 
 123. More specifically, Professor Henkin argued that: 
 The ‘political question’ doctrine . . . is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of 
several established doctrines . . . . 1. The courts are bound to accept decisions 
by the political branches within their constitutional authority. 2. The courts 
will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the political branches 
where the Constitution does not prescribe any. 3. Not all constitutional limita-
tions or prohibitions imply rights and standing to object in favor of private par-
ties. 4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity. 5. In 
principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions which can properly 
be interpreted as wholly or in part ‘self-monitoring’ and not the subject of judi-
cial review. (But the only one courts have found is the ‘guarantee clause’ as ap-
plied to challenges to state action, and even that interpretation was not inevi-
table.) 
Id. at 622-23. 
 124. United States Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (footnote 
omitted). 
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 The Court generally traces its doctrinal analysis of “political ques-
tions” to Baker v. Carr,125 in which Justice Brennan collected the 
various factors that determine justiciability. “Prominent on the sur-
face of any case held to involve a political question,” Justice Brennan 
said, is:  
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.126 
“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at 
bar,” Justice Brennan concluded, “there should be no dismissal for 
non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.”127 
 The Court’s shifting emphasis on these various factors can tell us 
a great deal about the political question doctrine itself. The first fac-
tor—textual commitment—has to do with the court’s authority to de-
cide the case and, at least as formulated, seems to have no prudential 
component at all. The second and third criteria—judicially 
manageable standards and nonjudicial policy determinations—are 
more prudential in nature but focused firmly on the Court’s ability to 
do a good job deciding the case.128 The final three criteria, by con-
trast, are also prudential but directed outward, toward the potential 
effects of a judicial decision in the broader political arena. The need 
to avoid disrespecting the other branches, to adhere to political deci-
sions already made, and to avoid undermining the government’s abil-
ity to speak with one voice—all are directed at the institutional con-
sequences of decision for the Court vis a vis other political actors. 
 Although Baker’s catalogue included these outward-looking pru-
dential considerations, its narrow description of them is striking. 
                                                                                                                    
 125. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 126. Id. at 217. 
 127. Id.  
 128. In this sense, these criteria are closely related to many of the Court’s justiciability 
criteria under the advisory opinion doctrine and more specific doctrines of standing, ripe-
ness, and mootness. These criteria, which tend to insist primarily on concrete factual set-
tings and adversary presentation of the issues, are likewise designed to force parties to 
frame issues in such a way that a court can competently decide them. See, e.g., RICHARD H. 
FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 81-82 (4th ed. 1996); Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciabil-
ity, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 51 (1984). 
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Alexander Bickel, by contrast, insisted that “[t]he political-question 
doctrine simply resists being domesticated” by turning it “into an act 
of constitutional interpretation governed by the general standards of 
the interpretive process.”129 For Bickel, the doctrine embodied “some-
thing greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not construction 
and not principle.”130 Bickel thus grounded the doctrine in: 
 The Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal 
parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to 
principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which 
tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much 
that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it 
should but will not be; (d) finally (‘in a mature democracy’), the in-
ner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is elec-
torally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.131 
 Baker itself signaled a shift away from these outward-looking con-
siderations by rejecting admonitions not to enter the “political 
thicket” of apportioning electoral districts.132 Insisting that “[t]he doc-
trine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘politi-
cal cases,’” Justice Brennan seemed to reject any suggestion that the 
Court should withhold judgment solely out of prudential concern for 
its own legitimacy.133 That judgment, reflected in a substantial line of 
cases since Baker,134 would seem to refute the most basic “political 
                                                                                                                    
 129. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 125-26 (1962). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 184. As we discuss further in Part IV.B., Bickel’s view drew a good bit of 
critical fire. Herbert Wechsler, for example, insisted that:  
[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that 
the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another 
agency of government than the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that 
judgment wisely . . . what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional inter-
pretation, to be made and judged by standards that should govern the interpre-
tive process generally. That, I submit, is toto caelo different from a broad dis-
cretion to abstain or intervene. 
HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-14 (1961). 
 132. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (warning that disre-
gard “of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court’s ‘judicial Power’ . . . may well 
impair the Court’s position as the ultimate organ of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ in that 
vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this 
Court must pronounce”). 
 133. Id. at 217 (majority opinion). 
 134. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126 (1986), for example, the Court explicitly 
rejected the argument that justiciability should turn on “the perceived need for judicial re-
view and on the potential practical problems with allowing such review.” See also, e.g., 
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (rejecting argument that the Court 
should not review a challenge to a financial assessment feature of the Victims of Crime Act 
under Article I’s Origination Clause on the ground that invalidation of the law would indi-
cate a “lack of respect” for the House of Congress that passed the bill); Japan Whaling 
Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (unanimously rejecting the argu-
ment that the Court should not review whether the Secretary of Commerce properly re-
fused to certify that Japan’s whaling practices undermined international conservation pro-
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question” arguments against deciding Bush v. Gore—that is, that the 
case was simply too “hot” for a court to handle.135 
 But what about a more specific argument, couched in terms of the 
post-Baker doctrine? That doctrine has emphasized the first two of 
Baker’s considerations—that is, whether there is “a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it.”136 In terms of the first criterion—textual 
commitment—it certainly seems arguable that the Twelfth Amend-
ment commits the kinds of controversies that presented themselves 
in Florida to Congress. The Amendment, after all, seems to contem-
plate the final resolution of contested presidential elections by a vot-
ing procedure in the House of Representatives. 
 “Textual commitment,” of course, has always been a problematic 
concept; it requires, one might say, its own interpretation. In a gov-
ernment of limited powers, after all, we usually think no government 
actor is empowered to act without some kind of “textual commit-
ment” of authority to that actor.137 A textual grant of authority to act 
thus cannot be sufficient to show that disputes concerning the use of 
that authority are nonjusticiable.138 Does Article II’s textual com-
mitment of authority to the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
                                                                                                                    
grams on the ground that “our decision may have significant political overtones” bearing 
on foreign relations with Japan); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (rejecting non-
justiciability arguments against reviewing the validity of the House of Representatives’ ex-
clusion of Adam Clayton Powell). As we will discuss further shortly, some of the prudential 
concerns behind the political question arguments in cases like these may now be reflected 
in more specific doctrines of justiciability, see, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 
(D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting a political question bar to adjudicating the constitutional authority 
of the President to initiate the Gulf War without congressional authorization, but dismiss-
ing the suit on ripeness grounds), or in the discretionary decision whether to grant certio-
rari, see infra Part IV.B. 
 135. An even more telling set of cases than those in the previous note may be those 
well-known instances in which the Court decided immensely controversial issues—
sometimes in the face of significant opposition from the other federal political branches—
without so much as a nod at the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Other decisions under equally momen-
tous circumstances have decisively rejected political question arguments. See, e.g., United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974). 
 136. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
The Nixon majority did not quote any of the other Baker factors. 
 137. But see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) 
(suggesting that the President has inherent authority to act in some foreign affairs 
contexts). Curtiss-Wright’s dictum on this point has been subject to considerable criticism. 
See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice 
Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973) 
(Sutherland’s history is “shockingly inaccurate”). 
 138. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1031 (1984). 
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faithfully executed”139 mean that executive action is not subject to ju-
dicial review? Surely not.140 
 We’re looking, then, for something more before we can say that a 
particular constitutional grant of authority to a nonjudicial actor 
renders that authority immune to second-guessing by the courts. 
What that “something more” consists of is, of course, the problem. In 
Nixon, the Court found it in words of exclusion in the relevant consti-
tutional text. Article I provides that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments,”141 and the Nixon majority found 
“considerable significance” in the word “sole.”142 The Twelfth 
Amendment includes no similar words of exclusion. One might argue, 
further, that the Amendment says nothing at all about how electors 
should be chosen in the first place. On this view, any nonjusticiabil-
ity bar to challenges to the initial selection process (on the ground, 
say, that the state certified the wrong slate of electors) would have to 
come from somewhere other than the Twelfth Amendment. 
 Another potential “something more” comes from the Court’s sec-
ond criterion—the lack of judicially manageable standards. As the 
Court noted in Nixon: 
 The concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political 
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the 
                                                                                                                    
 139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 140. Likewise, Article I, Section 8 contains a “textual commitment” to Congress of the 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Whatever our other disagreements concerning 
the federalism cases, the two of us do agree that the Court is not to be faulted for finding 
cases like Lopez and Morrison justiciable, notwithstanding this textual commitment. Mr. 
Levinson has recently become tempted to agree with Mark Tushnet’s call for the Court to 
abandon judicial review, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1998), but it is clear that until judicial review itself is jettisoned, cases like Lopez 
and Morrison easily merit a place on the Court’s docket. After all, the contrary argument 
would extend to cases raising not only the limits of the commerce power itself, but also 
First Amendment challenges to legislative actions taken pursuant to that power. See, e.g., 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (rejecting on the merits a 
claim that Department of Agriculture regulation concerning commercial advertising of ag-
ricultural products violated the First Amendment). 
 141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 142. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993); see also id. at 231 (“The com-
monsense meaning of the word ‘sole’ is that the Senate alone shall have authority to de-
termine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted.”). There are—aren’t there 
always?—problems with the argument. As Judge Nixon pointed out, “sole” might signify 
merely that “the Senate—not the courts, not a lay jury, not a Senate Committee—shall try 
impeachments.” Id. at 232 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 42). The Court ultimately had to 
fall back on the broader “history and contemporary understanding of the impeachment 
provisions” in order to refute this alternative reading, see id. at 233-35, showing that the 
plain text can only take one so far. 
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conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a 
coordinate branch.143  
Again, however, the Court’s criterion may itself be, well, unmanage-
able. Did Roe v. Wade144 announce “judicially manageable” stan-
dards? Miller v. California?145 BMW v. Gore?146 United States v. Lo-
pez?147 
 We have to confess that the “judicially manageable standards” cri-
terion becomes more and more confusing the more we think about it. 
It simply can’t mean that the Court should abstain on justiciability 
grounds in any or all areas in which it has arguably done a poor job 
of doctrinal elaboration.148 The Court seems to have in mind some 
sort of prospective evaluation of whether workable doctrine is likely 
to emerge in a given area; one does not see, for example, the Court 
surveying the shambles of its government funding for religion doc-
trine and retroactively declaring the whole thing nonjusticiable 
based on the failure of convincing doctrine to emerge over the years. 
In particular, the Court seems to ask whether the particular consti-
tutional text is suggestive of particular rules. The Nixon Court thus 
concluded that “the use of the word ‘try’ in the first sentence of the 
Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any ju-
dicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions.”149 
 Fair enough, but what does it mean, really? There are not many 
points in constitutional law where the actual doctrine emerges di-
rectly from the text. The Equal Protection Clause, for example, does 
not begin to indicate precisely what it means by “equal,”150 let alone 
posit that courts should use three different tiers of judicial scrutiny 
when evaluating different sorts of equal protection claims.151 Where 
the text does prescribe a standard, it is frequently so commodious 
                                                                                                                    
 143. Id. at 228-29.  
 144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 145. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 146. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 147. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 148. If it does, Mr. Levinson will happily declare all federalism disputes off limits to 
judicial review, while Mr. Young will cheerfully argue nonjusticiability in most free speech 
cases. But neither of us will necessarily expect the other—or perhaps many other people, 
either—to agree with us, and therein lies the obvious rub. 
 149. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 150. Indeed, see DOUGLAS RAE, DOUGLAS YATES, JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, JOSEPH 
HORONE, & CAROL FESSLER, EQUALITIES (1981), for a lovely demonstration that the con-
cept of “equality” includes no fewer than 128 logical possibilities. The very multiplicity of 
candidates as to what “equality” might “really” mean helps to explain why arguments often 
become so nasty, as one set of “egalitarians” committed to version #32 simply don’t under-
stand that those committed to a contradictory version #53 can, with perfect sincerity, also 
claim the mantle of “egalitarian.” 
 151. It would be like shooting ducks in a barrel to point to similar problems presented 
by defining “due process,” especially in its “substantive” form, or delimiting the precise lati-
tude allowed states when regulating matters that touch on interstate commerce. 
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that none of the operative doctrine—the points lawyers and judges 
actually argue and fret about in individual cases—can be gleaned 
from that textual directive. The Fourth Amendment, for instance, 
says searches must be reasonable.152 What’s “reasonable?” Ask a 
criminal defense expert, because the constitutional text is not going 
to help you. And even worse, we have sometimes had to ignore par-
ticular implementing rules mandated directly by the Constitution, 
precisely because those rules were not “manageable.” The obvious 
example here is the First Amendment’s relatively “clear” directive 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech,”153 which we have of course had to replace with a Byzantine 
set of doctrines that accommodate the more realistic needs of a civi-
lized society. 
 In any event, the interconnection of the “textual commitment” and 
“judicially manageable standards” ideas will, in many situations, suf-
fer from an even more fundamental difficulty. Textual commitment 
generally refers to the exercise of governmental authority in ques-
tion; manageable standards, on the other hand, has to do with the 
constitutional challenge to that exercise. Sometimes, we are talking 
about the same constitutional provision on both counts. In Nixon, for 
example, the Judge’s argument was that the Senate had violated the 
Impeachment Trial Clause itself by failing to “try” him within the 
meaning of that clause.154 It thus made sense to suggest that that 
Clause “commits” such issues to the Senate because the text suggests 
no standards under which a court might second-guess the Senate’s 
actions. 
 Political question cases, however, will often have a quite different 
structure. Around the same time it impeached Judge Nixon, the Sen-
ate also impeached Judge Alcee Hastings, who had the distinction of 
being the first black federal judge in Florida. Hastings argued that 
his impeachment was motivated by racism,155 that his real offense, 
from the perspective of his accusers, was being an “uppity Black.” If 
he had possessed sufficiently good evidence that this was so, Judge 
Hastings might have sought judicial review of his impeachment, not 
under the Impeachment Trial Clause as Judge Nixon did, but rather 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
                                                                                                                    
 152. More precisely: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 154. The problem arose from Judge Nixon’s trial under Senate Rule XI, “which allows a 
committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and 
to report that evidence to the full Senate,” which then votes on the impeachment. Nixon, 
506 U.S. at 226. 
 155. See William Raspberry, Race and Judge Hastings, WASH. POST, July 29, 1988, at 
A19. 
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that scenario, the textual commitment and manageable standards 
inquiries would presumably have to focus on different constitutional 
provisions. The textual commitment arguments would again focus on 
Article I, but the manageable standards inquiry would have to 
evaluate whether the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence on dis-
criminatory prosecutions can be applied in the context of impeach-
ment in a manageable way. In any event, the “precision” of the stan-
dards embodied in the Impeachment Trial Clause would no longer be 
the issue, as Judge Hastings’ claim would not have been brought un-
der those particular standards. 
 If all this is correct, then it suggests that the justiciability of chal-
lenges to various aspects of presidential elections turns not only on 
the Twelfth Amendment itself and whether it embodies a “textual 
commitment” of election disputes to Congress, but also on the par-
ticular nature of the constitutional arguments involved in those dis-
putes. The arguments—and sensible outcome—might be different, 
for example, from the different sets of arguments advanced by the 
per curiam and concurring opinions, respectively, in Bush v. Gore. On 
this view, Article II might be read as a textual commitment of dis-
putes concerning the appointment of electors to the state legislature, 
given that the text provides no standards for judicial evaluation of a 
state’s selection procedure.156 On the other hand, equal protection 
doctrine does contain any number of standards relevant to the appor-
tionment and counting of votes. The relevant question on the equal 
protection side, then, is whether the doctrines that the Court has 
been developing in terms of one-man, one-vote,157 vote dilution,158 re-
                                                                                                                    
 156. The Article II argument was that the barebones text of Article II, Section 1 gave 
to the Florida Legislature plenary authority with regard to naming electors and that the 
Florida Supreme Court could not even make reference to its own state constitutional 
norms in construing Florida legislation. This argument, originally presented by Harvard 
law professors Charles Fried and Einer Elhauge while representing the Florida Legisla-
ture, was, of course, the brunt of the argument made by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas in their concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore. For a sophisticated 
discussion of the Article II argument, see Dean M. Munyon, The Florida Election Contro-
versy and the “Scope of Delegation” Theory of the Elector Appointment Clause (2001) (un-
published manuscript, on file with authors). Mr. Levinson wishes to state that he contin-
ues to find the Article II argument a mixture of unpersuasive and offensive, in part be-
cause its proponents fixate on the text of the 1787 Constitution and totally ignore the text 
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment—“But when the right to vote at any election for 
the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States. . . .”—as well 
as the implications of the Seventeenth Amendment requiring that senators be elected by 
popular election. It is, he believes, inconceivable that anyone in 1913 imagined that legisla-
tures could continue to select electors—the last such episode was by Colorado in 1876—and 
that the proponents of the Amendment would not have added electors to the text of the 
amendment had the possibility of such legislative action been brought to their attention. 
Furthermore, he would emphasize the meaning of the “Republican Form of Government” 
guaranteed to the people of the States by Article IV. 
 157. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 158. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
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districting,159 and, perhaps, more aggressive rationality review,160 can 
be manageably extended to the context of non-race-based disparities 
in the counting of votes. 
 Our conclusion that nonjusticiability turns not only on the consti-
tutional power that authorized the act in question but also on the 
constitutional theory under which the act is challenged has implica-
tions, we think, for the choice between “strong” and “weak” theories 
of the political question doctrine. In cases like Nixon, the Court finds 
a textual commitment to the political branches in part because the 
relevant constitutional text provides no basis for saying that what 
the political branch did was unconstitutional; in other words, Nixon 
can be read consistently with Professor Henkin’s suggestion that 
“nonjusticiable” frequently means simply that the relevant political 
actors did not cross the bounds of the broad discretion granted by the 
Constitution in particular areas. Nothing in that case suggests, how-
ever, that were the relevant actors to use their discretion in a way 
that the Constitution plainly prohibits—such as impeaching Judge 
Hastings on account of his race—that the courts would lack power to 
intervene. 
 One can make a similar argument about Florida. We would not 
expect a nonjusticiability argument, for example, if Florida had for-
mally excluded black voters from the presidential election.161 The 
Courts would have well-established standards for judging such dis-
crimination, and the availability of such standards would militate 
strongly against finding a textual commitment of the dispute to Con-
gress (much less the state legislature) in Article II or the Twelfth 
Amendment. Perhaps one can explain the Bush v. Gore Court’s total 
lack of interest in the political question doctrine in similar terms, 
given the prominence of the equal protection theory in the per cu-
riam opinion. This requires, of course, that one takes seriously the 
majority’s embrace of equal protection theory—and what counts as a 
remedy for violation of equal protection—a topic about which the two 
authors would offer sharply conflicting analyses. 
B.   Institutional Prudence and the Fateful Grant of Certiorari: 
What’s a Nice Court Like You Doing with a Case Like This? 
 Even if this (highly tentative) doctrinal analysis of nonjusticiabil-
ity is correct, it is hard to resist the following question: if the political 
                                                                                                                    
 159. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 160. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 161. We acknowledge that some have claimed that Florida informally excluded black 
voters, but those claims face somewhat more difficult hurdles than in our hypothetical. 
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding that equal protection 
plaintiffs must prove purposeful discrimination on behalf of public actors in order to trig-
ger strict scrutiny). 
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question doctrine can’t save the Court from a mess like Bush v. Gore, 
then what good is it? The institutional damage that the Court seems 
to have incurred162—although very hard to measure, both in terms of 
magnitude and likely duration—prompts us to wonder whether the 
prudential concerns of which Professor Bickel spoke were so wisely 
abandoned. One answer, of course, is to say that prudence has not 
become irrelevant at all; rather, the interests that Professor Bickel 
relied upon the political question doctrine to guard have simply mi-
grated to other mechanisms, particularly the discretionary decision 
to grant or deny certiorari.163 
 That, of course, begs a further question: why in the world take 
this case? One of us, trying to be particularly circumspect about the 
election mess in mid-November 2000, refused to make any substan-
tive predictions for his Federal Courts class other than to say that 
the Supreme Court would never—in a million years!—hear this case. 
                                                                                                                    
 162. See, e.g., Mary J. Mullarkey, Courting Our Trust, THE DENVER POST, Feb. 4, 2001, 
at J1 (recounting results of a Colorado poll showing that 49% of respondents thought the 
decision in Bush v. Gore had undermined public confidence in the courts). Mr. Levinson is 
increasingly inclined to view the Court’s decision as a remarkably successful roll of the dice 
whereby it maximized its own power to shape the political agenda at the almost trivial cost 
of becoming the object of contempt from liberal law professors like himself and receiving 
relatively less diffuse support from Democrats (which would be made up for by enhanced 
support from Republicans). Consider that around Labor Day, 2000, 62% of the public ap-
proved of the “way the Supreme Court is handling its job”; only 25% disapproved. Democ-
rats were more enthusiastic about the court (70%) than were Republicans (60%), an inter-
esting factoid in itself given the increasingly conservative drift of the Court in many areas 
other than abortion. But see Young, supra note 101 (noting many other areas of “liberal” 
Rehnquist Court activism other than abortion). In mid-January 2001, the overall approval 
rate had declined a mere three percentage points, from 62% to 59%, though disapproval 
jumped by a third, from 25% to 34%. Not surprisingly, Republican approval had skyrock-
eted, while Democratic support went down to 42%, with a full 50% disapproving. The most 
recent polling was done in June 2001, and the overall approval-disapproval figures are now 
identical to what they had been almost the year before, 62% to 25%. Democrats are clearly 
learning to live with, if not to love the Court, as 54% now approve; the 50% who had regis-
tered disapproval in January are now reduced to a mere 32%. Republican enthusiasm has 
diminished a bit, though it is still a robust 74%, and independents are actually at their 
peak of regard, with 59% approving and only 26% disapproving. See Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Into the Electoral Waters: The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge 
of the Supreme Court, JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 2001, at 32. All of this supports the proposi-
tion that Democratic members of Congress will be hesitant to engage in retaliatory meas-
ures against the Court, even if they had the inclination to do so, given that the majority of 
their constituents continue to give strong support to the Court as an institution. Cf. Neal 
Devins, The Federalism/Rights Nexus: Why Senate Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court 
Decisions but Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that 
Democrats are unlikely to retaliate against the Court other than by scrutinizing future ap-
pointments).   
 163. Professor Bickel himself urged use of the Court’s discretion to deny review as an 
avoidance device, BICKEL, supra note 129, at 141-43. When Bickel wrote, however, much of 
the Court’s jurisdiction was still nondiscretionary. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT 
WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1636-41 (1st ed. 1953) 
(describing the evolution of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction). By 1996, the Hart & 
Wechsler casebook was able to describe the certiorari mechanism as “[p]erhaps the most 
important of the avoidance devices.” FALLON ET AL., supra note 128, at 1711.  
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And in fact there seems to have been substantial opposition on the 
Court to the grant of certiorari, a view that found expression in sev-
eral of the dissents from the Court’s ultimate resolution of the dis-
pute.164 
 In approaching the Court’s decision to take the case, it may help 
to start with the traditional criteria in Supreme Court Rule 10.165 
That rule has traditionally emphasized conflicts— among the federal 
circuits166 or the state supreme courts,167 and between decisions of 
those courts and decisions of the Supreme Court168—and the Justices 
have long insisted that it sits to resolve conflicts rather than correct 
errors.169 Many observers thus predicted that the Court would deny 
certiorari in Bush v. Gore on the ground that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision was unlikely to create any ongoing conflict in federal 
law. The case, after all, had a certain sui generis quality to it, and the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision seemed likely to be of continuing 
significance primarily for purposes of interpreting the relevant state 
election laws. 
 The Court’s rules, however, have an important catch-all provision 
for cases in which “a state court or a United States court of appeals 
has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, 
but should be, settled by this Court,” even in the absence of a con-
flict.170 “Importance,” moreover, does not indicate merely the continu-
ing importance of the legal issue presented by the case. As our col-
league H.W. Perry has observed, some cases “are important in and of 
themselves; that is, it is the resolution of the particular case, not 
                                                                                                                    
 164. See the first line of Justice Souter’s opinion (joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens, 
and Ginsburg) in Bush v. Gore: “The Court should not have reviewed either Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd., or this case . . . .” 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Similarly, Justice Breyer begins his opinion by writing “The Court was wrong to 
take this case.” Id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 165. The Court has always insisted, however, that the considerations listed in Rule 19 
are illustrative rather than exhaustive. E.g., Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, Inc., 
349 U.S. 70, 77 (1955). 
 166. SUP. CT. R. 10(a).  
 167. Id. 10(b). 
 168. Id. 10(c). 
 169. See, e.g., Hon. Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address Before the 
American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. v, vii: 
The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the 
correction of errors in lower court decisions. . . . The function of the Supreme 
Court is . . . to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen 
among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power 
over lower federal courts. 
See also H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 246 (1991) (“Without a doubt, the single most important generalizable 
factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or ‘split’ in the circuits.”). 
 170. SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
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necessarily the legal issue, that is important.”171 This general “impor-
tance” criterion has supported review in any number of cases simply 
based on their significance to the nation or to the operations of the 
federal government. In United States v. Winstar Corp.,172 for exam-
ple, the Court seems to have granted certiorari mostly because the 
decision of the federal circuit below, holding that the United States 
was liable for contract damages to various participants in the savings 
and loan debacle, put the government on the hook for tens of billions 
of dollars. As one of us has observed elsewhere, it is “difficult indeed 
to read the Court’s own Rule 10 as anything other than an invitation 
. . . to the making of ‘political choice(s)’ about what is ‘important’ 
enough to demand the overt, highly visible intervention of the United 
States Supreme Court.”173  
 To say that “importance” is a political criterion, however, is not to 
suggest that it is unbounded by principle. As Professor Perry has 
demonstrated, it is frequently possible for the Court to determine 
that an issue is important independent of any views as to what 
should prove the proper outcome.174 We thus find it hard to believe 
that any Supreme Court Justice—especially one sitting behind a veil 
of ignorance as to the parties and posture of the case—could seri-
ously maintain that a nonfrivolous argument that the President of 
the United States was being elected in a manner that violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and/or Article II was not sufficiently “impor-
tant” to justify a spot on the Court’s docket.175 If anything, the argu-
ment against certiorari seems to be almost that the case was too im-
portant to decide. 
 This last point, of course, returns us to the prudential argument, 
that is, that the Court should have avoided a decision in the case in 
                                                                                                                    
 171. PERRY, supra note 169, at 253.  
 172. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
 173. Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717, 
736 (1993) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 169). 
 174. See PERRY, supra note 169, at 260 (observing that “[m]ost issues of societal impor-
tance, and many of legal importance, are ones where the justices would agree that the is-
sue is important”).  
 175. As noted earlier, supra note 156, Mr. Levinson is inclined to argue that the Article 
II arguments, unlike the Equal Protection argument (or, as Pam Karlan points out, what 
may be in fact a Due Process argument, see Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection, supra 
note 46), are frivolous on the merits, though this runs up against the obvious problem that 
three Justices, not to mention a former Solicitor General of the United States, found the 
Article II arguments meritorious; see also Munyon, supra note 156 (concluding that the 
concurrence’s argument was incorrect but not frivolous). In any event, for purposes of 
evaluating the case for certiorari, he has no difficulty stipulating that an equal protection 
argument that at least six Justices were willing to endorse as meritorious (and a seventh, 
Justice Breyer, took seriously without ultimately committing himself), is sufficiently 
nonfrivolous to warrant a decision on the merits by the Court unless there are dispositive 
reasons to interpret the Constitution as assigning to another institution, such as Congress, 
the responsibility for deciding any such claims. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
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order to avoid institutional damage to its legitimacy. Both commen-
tators and individual Justices have attacked the Court’s reliance on 
prudential considerations precisely because any defense of such be-
havior seems almost to celebrate what Gerald Gunther criticized as 
“manipulative dissimilation” and “intervention in the political proc-
ess” in his notable attack on Alexander Bickel’s enthusiastic exhorta-
tion that the Court self-consciously use its certiorari discretion to 
avoid issuing rulings that might detract from the Court’s legiti-
macy.176 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist has argued that the Court’s 
discretion to deny review “does not imply that it should be used as a 
sort of judicial storm cellar to which we may flee to escape from con-
troversial or sensitive cases.”177 On the other hand, the certiorari de-
cision may be the best point in the process to exercise unprincipled, 
prudential judgment—as opposed to holding a case nonjusticiable on 
political question, standing, ripeness, or mootness grounds—
precisely because the certiorari decision need not be explained or jus-
tified by the Court. The Court therefore need not mask its overtly 
prudential motivations for denying review by constructing appar-
ently principled rationales that it is not in fact prepared to apply 
faithfully in the next case.178 
 We are unlikely to resolve this perennial debate over principles 
and prudence in this Essay, and in any event we have a somewhat 
different question: assuming that the Court can deny review on pru-
dential grounds, how broad should its frame of reference be? We have 
in mind the argument advanced, most notably by Judge Richard 
Posner, that the Court should take into account not only the threat to 
its own legitimacy from deciding the case, but also the threat to the 
broader legitimacy of the government as a whole posed by a failure to 
decide.179 On the weekend prior to the Supreme Court’s final decision, 
                                                                                                                    
 176. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Princi-
ple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1964). Professor Gunther 
went on to argue that “Bickel’s approach to certiorari . . . undercuts his goal of a principled, 
candid evolution of constitutional interpretation. Expediency as to avoidance devices is 
contagious; the effort to shield the integrity of adjudication on the merits from infection 
fails.” Id. 
 177. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1081 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). Indeed, Edward Hartnett has gone so far as to argue that the exis-
tence of discretion to “duck” cases through the certiorari mechanism calls into question the 
classic justification for judicial review as “the byproduct of a court’s obligation to decide a 
case.” Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years af-
ter the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1714 (2000); see also BICKEL, supra note 
129, at 127 (noting “the difficulty of reconciling the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction 
with Marbury v. Madison and Cohens v. Virginia ” ). 
 178. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 
1462 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s standing holdings sometimes mask unwillingness to 
decide particular sorts of claims for other reasons).  
 179. See Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: The Election Deadlock and the Litigation 
that Ensued, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54.  
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sixty-one percent of respondents in a nationwide Gallup poll said 
that they trusted the Court to decide the election controversy, as op-
posed to seventeen percent for Congress.180 Although we doubt that 
the Court was paying much attention to poll numbers that weekend, 
the numbers would surely lend support to an intuitive judgment, on 
the part of the Justices in the majority, that the government as a 
whole would take a lesser legitimacy “hit” if the election was ulti-
mately resolved by the Court than, say, by Tom Delay’s House of 
Representatives. Under those circumstances, would a denial of cer-
tiorari on prudential grounds have amounted to admirable judicial 
“restraint” or institutional selfishness, with the Court hoarding its 
own legitimacy at the expense of the system as a whole?181 
 These concerns about the legitimacy of a nonjudicial resolution to 
our troubled election do, as suggested by University of Chicago pro-
fessor Elizabeth Garrett, appear to exhibit a distrust of politics and 
of the messiness that the political process is thought to engender.182 
It was up to the Court to “save” the public from such messiness or, 
even more, the purported “crisis” presented by the prospect of linger-
ing uncertainty as to the identity of the next Chief Executive.183 In-
deed, Professor Pildes argues that the best way of understanding a 
number of recent decisions by the Supreme Court is in terms of its 
                                                                                                                    
 180. Will Lester, Americans Split on Recount, Polls Say; Big Majority Trusts Court to 
Decide Fairly, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 12, 2000, at 23. Nine percent of respondents pre-
ferred the Supreme Court of Florida, and seven percent preferred the Florida Legislature. 
Id. Asked simply whether they thought the U.S. Supreme Court would decide the case 
fairly, almost three-fourths of respondents said yes. Id. Polls conducted by NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal and ABC News/Washington Post yielded “generally consistent” results on 
these questions. Id.; see also Michael Tackett, Nation Waits on Supreme Court; Justices 
Caught at Intersection of Law and Presidential Politics, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1 
(“The closest thing to unanimity is that the American people trust the U.S. Supreme Court 
more than any other institution to make the final call about how to proceed.”). 
 181. It may be relevant to note that some of the same post-decision polls showing a de-
crease in public confidence in the Court also indicate a majority belief that the Court 
reached the right result. See Mullarkey, supra note 162, at J1. It may also be the case that 
liberals who championed such decisions as Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), may 
be without authority to castigate the Court for its inability to resist the temptation to ad-
judicate the Florida controversies. 
 182. See Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons From the 2000 Presidential Election, 
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 975, 983 (2001). 
 183. Perhaps the most significant “crisis” has to do with the delay in the new Presi-
dent’s being able to pick a Cabinet and, in this age of the hypersecurity state, to have his 
choices undergo requisite FBI vetting prior to Senate hearings. Elsewhere, Mr. Levinson 
has castigated the long hiatus between election and inauguration as a particularly stupid 
feature of our political system, not least because it means that voters make their choice 
with no real knowledge of who in fact will staff a new Administration. See Levinson, supra 
note 1, at 183-84. As it happens, the hiatus was functional in the situation of the 2000 elec-
tion—just imagine what might have happened if the United States followed the British 
practice, which is to install a new prime minister almost literally the next day following an 
election. Mr. Levinson, however, remains convinced that, overall, this is ultimately more 
evidence as to how the present system of choosing (and then inaugurating) Presidents is 
seriously dysfunctional to the operation of a modern, complex democratic polity. 
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fundamental fear of democratic “disorder.”184 Even if this were the 
case, of course, it would not necessarily be such a bad thing. Just as 
we do not tend to fault an umpire at a baseball game for refusing to 
permit the “messiness” that would result from political appeals to the 
spectators in the stands concerning whether a runner was safe or 
out, so, too, it may be the Court’s legitimate role to enforce certain 
ground rules of political competition. The mere suggestion that such 
a role exemplifies “distrust” of democratic politics serves merely to 
begin a conversation about whether that distrust is appropriate un-
der the circumstances.185 
 We conclude our discussion by focusing on one particular aspect of 
the potential “messiness” that may have given the Court potential 
concern and, even more to the point, should worry any thoughtful 
citizen. That is the particular voting rule articulated in the Twelfth 
Amendment, which may cast particular doubt on the legitimacy of 
congressional resolution of presidential elections. 
C.   The Ultimate Stupidity of the Twelfth Amendment 
 The Twelfth Amendment not only provides a procedure for resolv-
ing disputed elections but also articulates a special voting rule that 
views the House of Representatives, like the Senate, as consisting of 
equally empowered state delegations with votes to be cast when pick-
ing the President on a one-state, one-vote basis. As a matter of fact, 
the new House of Representatives has a Republican majority, and 
Republicans control a majority of the delegations. Still, had the 
House ultimately been charged with the duty to select the President, 
it is at least thinkable that it might matter a great deal whether the 
voting rule were one-member, one-vote or one-state, one-vote. If the 
former obtained, one might well imagine that half-a-dozen Republi-
can representatives might have cast their ballots for Al Gore, espe-
cially if there was good reason to believe that he had in fact won Flor-
ida in addition to the incontrovertible fact that he gained more votes 
throughout the nation than did George W. Bush.186 That result would 
                                                                                                                    
 184. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001), re-
printed in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Richard Epstein & Cass 
Sunstein eds., 2001). One might similarly interpret the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore as 
reflecting the concern for finality evident in the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (affirming lower courts’ denial of habeas corpus 
petition); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (remanding with instructions to dismiss 
habeas corpus petition). 
 185. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  
 186. It should go without saying that Mr. Levinson believes that Gore “really” won 
Florida. Mr. Young, on the other hand, sees no reason to reject the decisions made by au-
thorized Florida officials that the “real” winner was George W. Bush. See also Dennis Cau-
chon & Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the Election; Bush Still Prevails in 
Recount of All Disrupted Ballots, Using Two Most Common Standards, USA TODAY, May 
11, 2001, at 1A (reporting results of comprehensive examination of Florida ballots by major 
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probably be much less likely under the constitutionally ordained vot-
ing rule. 
 One can well imagine scenarios whereby selection by the House 
would produce a “crisis.” Even if we would not have celebrated the 
bicentennial of the 1801 election by issuing similar threats to pick up 
arms and march on Washington, one can still envision mass marches 
and probable riots that would make even the election dispute of 1876 
look a bit tame. So, given the probability that George W. Bush was 
destined to become the new President regardless, as Judge Posner 
argues, the Court did the country a favor by heading off any such 
possibility.187 
 What is most interesting about this argument is that it appears to 
accept the premise that the constitutionally ordained resolution is 
seriously dysfunctional (a more polite word than “stupid”) in today’s 
world and, therefore, must, as with the Habitation Clause, be ignored 
or neutralized. There is, as suggested earlier, nothing radical in this 
suggestion: it explains not only such decisions as Blaisdell but also 
the more general development of the “compelling interest” doctrine, 
which is best understood as a way of avoiding the impact of what 
otherwise would be categorical prohibitions of certain kinds of gov-
ernmental activity.188 Or, to offer yet another example, the practical 
irrelevance of the Declaration of War Clause189 is surely evidence of a 
widespread belief that the country can no longer afford to pay the 
price of a full executive/congressional partnership with regard to 
many decisions involving the use of American armed force. 
 Still, unlike these other examples, where full neutralization may 
be feasible, the Twelfth Amendment continues to have potential bite 
in the case of a true Electoral College deadlock, such as occurred in 
1824 or could quite easily have occurred in 1948 and 1968, when both 
Strom Thurmond and George C. Wallace gained thirty-nine and 
forty-six electoral votes, respectively, in regionally based racialist 
                                                                                                                    
newspapers). More recently, The New York Times and other newspapers that were engaged 
in their own recount have apparently decided to “hold indefinitely” from the public any in-
formation as to what the results were. See Richard Berke, It’s Not a Time for Party, But for 
How Long?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at § 4, p. 3. The truth about the Florida vote pre-
sumably no longer comes within the motto emblazoned on the front page of every issue of 
The New York Times: “All the News That’s Fit to Print.” One obvious implication, for those 
committed to a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” is that the information, if released, would not 
be conducive to the post-September 11 spirit of rallying around Mr. Bush. Mr. Young, for 
his part, is far too busy rallying to speculate on these matters. 
 187. See Posner, supra note 179, at 46. 
 188. See Young, supra note 99, at 1594-95 (describing balancing tests like “compelling 
interest” as “resistance norms” that make particular government actions more difficult but 
not impossible). 
 189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
972  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:925 
 
candidacies.190 It is only blind luck that the extremely close Truman-
Dewey and Nixon-Humphrey campaigns in fact generated electoral 
vote majorities. In 1968, for example, Richard Nixon prevailed in the 
race for California’s then-forty electoral votes by approximately 
224,000 out of 7.5 million votes.191 Had, therefore, only 115,000 per-
sons voted for Humphrey instead of Nixon, there would have been no 
majority winner in the Electoral College, as Nixon would have had 
only 261 of the 270 votes necessary for election. 
 Similarly, in 1948, Harry Truman carried California, which then 
had twenty-five votes, by only 18,000 votes and Illinois, which had 
twenty-eight votes, by 34,000 votes.192 Democrats had significant ma-
jorities in the House of Representatives in both the eighty-first and 
ninety-first Congresses,193 but would anyone argue that the country 
at large would have easily accepted the designation by the House of 
Harry Truman, or, even more so, Hubert Humphrey? The latter after 
all, would, even with the hypothetical redistributions, have lagged 
well behind the combined national vote of Richard Nixon and George 
Wallace and even Nixon alone had the hypothetical redistribution of 
voters been limited to the California 115,000. And consider the fact 
that the House delegations in those states that went for Wallace 
might well have been tempted to choose Nixon, perhaps as the result 
of 1824-like deals between Nixon and Wallace. 
 There is no reason to believe that the United States will necessar-
ily be spared further regionally based third parties and, therefore, an 
electoral vote deadlock, which would require the House of Represen-
tatives to choose the President. If one agrees that the one-state, one-
vote rule is dysfunctional in the modern world, then, at the very 
least, a constitutional amendment could replace it with a presumably 
far more acceptable one-member, one-vote rule. That is, the after-
math of the 2000 Election could mimic that of the Election of 1800 
insofar as the present system of choosing Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents would be the subject of formal constitutional amendment, even 
if the most important features of the present system, including the 
Electoral College itself and the assignment to Congress of formal re-
sponsibility to break deadlocks, remain in place. 
 An obvious question is whether the 2000 Election will in fact lead 
to any systematic discussion of the adequacy of our formal institu-
tional structure. Although many pundits predicted in the immediate 
aftermath that the country might be amenable to such discussion, 
there has been precious little of it occurring. Quite remarkably, the 
                                                                                                                    
 190. See 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, 
supra note 14, at 1073. 
 191. Id. at 1077. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 1083. 
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one proposal for constitutional amendment that is receiving substan-
tial attention, at least as of mid-February, concerns the presidential 
pardoning power;194 there are, so far as we know, no serious propos-
als to modify the way we choose Presidents, at least beyond the 
search for technological fixes with regard to the voting machinery it-
self.195 This may reflect an overall level of satisfaction with our basic 
structure; it could, more ominously, reflect a feeling of despair about 
the practical likelihood of achieving even the most limited formal 
change, given the requirement of surmounting the obstacles placed 
in the way by Article V.196 
CONCLUSION 
 Part of our project in co-authoring this Essay has been to see if 
two colleagues with widely varying views on matters both jurispru-
dential and political can, nonetheless, come to some measure of 
agreement concerning significant issues facing constitutional schol-
ars. This project is especially interesting, at least to us, with regard 
to the events of the past winter, about which feelings continue to be 
deep and, on occasion, tempers raw. We think we have demonstrated 
that collaboration is possible197 and, we hope, fruitful. At the very 
least, the strange case of the Twelfth Amendment raises substantive 
issues that go well beyond, and much deeper—if this is not to mix 
metaphors—the particular difficulties posed by the Florida vote. (In-
deed, as we noted at the outset, our initial interest in the Amend-
ment, and in the prospect of collaborating, arose with regard to the 
selection of Dick Cheney to be Governor Bush’s running mate, and 
surprisingly little of this paper depends for its force of argument on 
the particularities of the Florida fiasco.) The Amendment stands 
witness, after all, that the Constitution both raises particular issues 
and provides processes for their resolution that stand outside the 
mainstream of contemporary judicial review—that is, court-centered 
decisionmaking focused on the vindication of individual rights. Our 
understanding of the Constitution will be the richer, we think, if we 
both question our substantive constitutional priorities and recognize 
that these issues are frequently too important to be left exclusively to 
courts. 
                                                                                                                    
 194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 195. See, e.g., Palm Beach Opts for Touch-Screen Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at 
A14. 
 196. As we go to press in the late Fall of 2001, the prospect of far-reaching reform of 
the electoral process at the federal level seems even more remote, swept from the national 
agenda by the events of September 11, 2001.  
 197. Mr. Young is happy to report that no junior faculty member was harmed in the 
production of this Essay. 
